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General Abstract 
 
 
Little is known about how managers select risky strategic actions such as the introduction 
of innovations, engagement in alliances, mergers, or any other strategic choice (Simon and 
Houghton, 2003). While the importance of firm’s strategic processes has been acknowledged 
both theoretically and empirically, few efforts have been committed to understanding the 
decision paths through which managers select such risky actions and how they affect 
performance. 
Variables related to the decision-making process, such as the type of information utilized 
in decision-making, and the rules for processing information have been downplayed as 
determinants of organizational outcomes. Decision theory has analyzed these variables mainly 
through neoclassical theories emphasizing rationality of agents. In the last decades, descriptive 
behavioral theories assuming bounded rationality of agents have surged to tackle these variables 
in order to explain risky actions, though little of this research deals directly with strategic 
management issues.  
In the specific case of innovation, while most studies exploring the determinants of 
innovative performance have looked at organizational structures, resources and environmental 
characteristics, only a few studies have emphasized the influence decision making strategies on 
firm innovation (Simon and Houghton, 2003). Moreover, this kind of studies have focused on 
individual-level characteristics of key decision makers (e.g. upper echelons) as variables 
affecting innovation, such as age, educational background, and other socio-demographic 
characteristics. However, the effect of cognitive processes on firm innovation has been generally 
overlooked up to date. 
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The general lack of attention to cognitive aspects is reflected in many studies which 
implicitly state that decision makers are homogeneous inputs and perfect substitutes for one 
another taking part in the organization process. However, this neoclassical view fails to explain 
why organizations with similar resources, and facing similar economic environments, make 
significantly different decisions. Managers not only depart from the principles of classical 
decision theory, but are also subject to different judgmental biases when making decisions under 
uncertainty (March and Shapira, 1987; Hogarth, 1987). During the strategic decision-making 
process, managers look upon organizational and environmental factors as a base for their 
decisions, and act as filtering mechanisms interpreting data through their particular cognitive 
mechanisms. Therefore, identifying the differences in cognitive processes of managers may help 
explain the differences in their decisions to innovate. 
In line with behavioral decision research (Hogarth, 1987; Kahneman, 2003) and other 
behavioral studies of organizational decision-making (Cyert and March, 1963; March and 
Shapira, 1987; Levinthal and March, 1993) I intend to examine the decision-making process 
followed by organizations by exploring the cognitive processes they follow when making 
strategic decisions in general. The present study will focus on the literature on heuristics and 
cognitive biases, and on decision making styles.  
Heuristics are habitual simplifying strategies, or “rules of thumb”, which people 
commonly use to reduce the amount of information they must consider in decision-making. 
Cognitive biases are systematic errors of judgment that lead to cognitive illusions which are not 
easily eliminated. The literature on behavioral decision-making has also recognized two 
fundamental styles of thinking and deciding: an analytical mode and a non-analytical mode 
(Kahneman, 2003). Decisions made with the analytical mode undergo computation, consultation, 
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or evaluation of analytical data. Non-analytical decisions are intuitive, and do not make use of 
exhaustive data processing, and rely on heuristics, impressions, and associative or emotional 
tools (Kahneman, 2003). These different styles are suitable for particularly different decision 
environments, and exploring which one is more suitable for strategic decision processes 
regarding innovation is an open avenue for research. 
The central contention of this thesis is that it is essential to understand non-rational1 
decision-making in order to understand why different cognitive processes may lead to different 
organizational decisions, behaviors and performances. I attempt to address this central theme 
through three essays, each one focusing on a different question and adopting a different 
methodology.  
In Chapter I, I explore how different decision making styles adopted by firms during the 
R&D process affect innovative outcomes, and also how these decision making styles are related 
to the size of firms. More precisely, I develop a mediation model in which firm size is proposed 
to affect the scale and quality of innovative output through the adoption of different decision-
making styles during the R&D process. Based on the literature on cognition, I distinguish 
between highly-analytical and low-analytical decision making styles. Using a unique 
longitudinal data set from Spanish manufacturing firms in which CEO’s are asked about the 
specific tools and procedures they use during the R&D process, I approximate firms’ decision-
making style and explore the validity of this mediation model. I show that that as firms increase 
in size, they rely more extensively on analytical decision tools for the R&D process, and 
consequently, highly analytical decision making leads to lower R&D productivity in terms of the 
                                                 
1
 The term “non-rational” is used here to describe any behavior that cannot be fitted into a rational choice model, as 
proposed by the neoclassical economics tradition. Also, “rationality” excludes all actions based on emotion, habits, 
and values.  
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scale of innovative output, while it leads to higher R&D productivity in terms of the quality of 
innovative output. 
In Chapter II, I elaborate on a well known behavioral tendency termed “illusion of 
control”, which is believed to be responsible for people preferring to ‘be in charge’ themselves as 
opposed to others in situations involving uncertainty. Despite its recognition, there is little 
research exploring the conditions in which people prefer someone else to be in charge of dealing 
with an uncertain task. I propose source of information as a key factor affecting peoples’ 
tendency to prefer being in charge. Information about the focal task can be learned through 
experience or through a convenient description. In this chapter I present two experimental studies 
in which I show that illusion of control interacts with source of information in an interesting 
manner. While subjects that sample a lottery from experience bet higher amounts when the 
lottery is activated by themselves (rather than the experimenter), subjects that learn about the 
lottery from description bet higher amounts when the lottery is activated by the experimenter. 
Also, higher perceived risk from experience leads to higher illusions of control. 
In Chapter III, I review the research on organizational learning. Recently, this stream of 
research has revealed the existence of “superstitious learning” in strategic decision processes. 
Yet, while the literature points at overconfidence as a central variable related to superstitious 
learning, it does not provide an explanation on why superstitious learning takes place or what 
individual-level processes causes it. Drawing on research in cognitive psychology, I seek to 
illustrate some properties which make it difficult for organizations to acquire knowledge from 
the strategic decisions they have previously experienced. I propose hindsight bias as a 
mechanism leading to superstitious learning, and other cognitive simplification heuristics related 
to the experience-based learning process. In this chapter I use in-depth interviews to top 
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managers to gather information about experiential learning processes in strategic decision 
making in order to formulate the theoretical propositions. Managerial implications are also 
identified and new directions for further research are proposed.  
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Resumen en Castellano 
 
 
Esta tesis doctoral intenta contribuir a la respuesta de la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cómo 
afectan las diferencias en la toma de decisiones al desempeño de las organizaciones? Al mismo 
tiempo, explora las diferentes fuentes de información y conocimiento que utilizan las empresas 
para tomar decisiones bajo incertidumbre y estudia como la adopción de diferentes fuentes de 
información puede afectar el comportamiento de las organizaciones. La tesis se divide en tres 
capítulos independientes y se utilizan tres metodologías diferentes. 
En el Capítulo I, se explora cómo los diferentes estilos de toma de decisión adoptados por 
las empresas afectan el resultado final de los procesos de investigación y desarrollo (I+D), al 
mismo tiempo que se estudia la relación entre los diferentes estilos y el tamaño de las empresas 
Desarrollamos un modelo de mediación en el cual proponemos que el tamaño de las empresas 
afecta al estilo de toma de decisiones y el estilo de toma de decisiones afecta la productividad en 
I+D. En este caso, la medición de productividad contempla aspectos tanto de la cantidad como 
de la calidad del output innovador. Basándonos en la literatura cognitiva, distinguimos entre 
estilos de decisión altamente analíticos y poco analíticos. Usamos datos longitudinales de la 
Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales, en la cual empresas españolas proveen información sobre 
el tipo de información y los procesos que utilizan durante la toma de decisiones en el proceso de 
I+D. Usando estos datos podemos aproximarnos a una medida del estilo de toma de decisiones 
de cada empresa. Se demuestra la existencia de una relación positiva entre el tamaño de la 
empresa y el énfasis en el estilo altamente analítico, al mismo tiempo que observamos una 
relación negativa entre el estilo altamente analítico y la productividad en términos de ‘cantidad’ 
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de innovaciones, mientras que la productividad en términos de ‘calidad’ se relaciona 
positivamente. 
En el Capítulo II, se desarrolla el concepto de “ilusión del control”, una conducta muy 
investigada a la cual se atribuye la tendencia de las personas a preferir estar a cargo ellas mismas, 
en vez de otros, en situaciones de incertidumbre. A pesar del reconocimiento de esta tendencia, 
existe poca investigación que explore las condiciones en las cuales los individuos prefieren  que 
otras personas estén a cargo situaciones de incertidumbre. En este capítulo se propone que la 
fuente de información por la cual los individuos aprenden sobre la tarea bajo incertidumbre, 
afecta la propensión de los individuos a preferir estar a cargo o no de una tarea con 
incertidumbre. En general la gente puede informarse acerca de una situación de incertidumbre a 
través de la experiencia o a través de fuentes descriptivas. Proponemos dos experimentos en los 
cuales se demuestra que la ilusión del control interactúa con la fuente de información de una 
forma muy peculiar. Mientras los individuos que se informan a través de la experiencia están 
dispuestos a apostar mayor cantidades cuando ellos están a cargo de activar una lotería, los 
individuos que se informan con información descriptiva tienden a apostar una cantidad mayor de 
dinero cuando otra persona está a cargo de activar la lotería. Al mismo tiempo, la mayor 
percepción del riesgo derivado del aprendizaje a través de la experiencia lleva a mayores niveles 
de ilusión del control. 
En el Capítulo III, se presenta una revisión de la literatura sobre el aprendizaje 
organizativo. Recientemente, en la literatura del aprendizaje organizativo, se revela la tendencia 
un error sistemático llamado aprendizaje ‘supersticioso’ cuando las organizaciones aprenden de 
decisiones estratégicas pasadas. El principal fenómeno que se ha propuesto para explicar esta 
tendencia es el overconfidence. De todos modos, las explicaciones propuestas no explican de 
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forma precisa los mecanismos por los cuales surgen estos errores en el aprendizaje organizativo, 
ni tampoco proponen causas a nivel individual que puedan ser responsables de estos errores. 
Utilizando la literatura sobre psicología cognitiva, ilustramos algunas de las propiedades que 
limitan los procesos de aprendizaje en las organizaciones cuando se trata de aprender de 
decisiones estratégicas pasadas. Proponemos al sesgo de retrospección (hindsight bias) como un 
mecanismo esencial para explicar la presencia del aprendizaje supersticioso. A través de 
entrevistas en profundidad a gerentes en altos cargos de organizaciones sanitarias, recopilamos 
información y puntos de vista para generar proposiciones teóricas sobre las causas de los errores 
en el aprendizaje relacionado con decisiones estratégicas. Finalmente, derivamos implicaciones 
prácticas y proponemos posibles extensiones de esta investigación. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Decision-Making Style as a Mediator between Firm Size and R&D Productivity: A 
Cognitive Perspective 
 
Introduction 
Although the innovation literature has shown considerable evidence that firm size affects R&D 
productivity (e.g., Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Tether, 1998; Benner and Tushman, 2002), the 
specific decision-making processes that mediate between organizational size and innovation 
outcomes are still not well understood (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). One specific gap in this 
causal chain is particularly important: the lack of understanding of how firms’ size affects how 
they gather and process information for strategic decisions (Merz and Sauber, 1995; Fiegenbaum 
and Karnani, 1991) and, in turn, how these decision-making styles become manifested in 
organizational choices or courses of action (Khatri and Ng, 2000). By integrating the literatures 
on cognition (Dane and Pratt, 2007) and innovation, we examine the relation between R&D 
productivity and the adoption of different decision-making styles during the innovation process, 
and analyzes whether decision-making styles are related to the size of organizations. 
Existing research reveals that small firms differ from large corporations in terms of the 
use of information (Smeltzer, Fann and Nikoliasen, 1988), planning activities (Huang, Soutar 
and Brown, 2002; Smith, Gannon, Grimm and Mitchell, 1988), formality of organizing (Miller, 
Dröge and Toulouse, 1988) and reliance on external advice (Nahavandi and Chesteen, 1988) 
among other aspects. While these studies are highly informative about individual management 
practices and their relation to firm size, they overlook the possibility of a holistic perspective in 
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which the mix of management practices adopted by firms of different size reflects their decision-
making style. Our central argument is that small and large firms possess fundamentally different 
styles of thinking and deciding, and these differences are likely to affect key organizational 
outcomes which are sensitive to decision processes. We believe that exploring the effect of 
decision-making style on innovative performance is important because the R&D phase is highly 
uncertain, entails complex search processes, requires rapid exploitation of new ideas and 
environmental scanning, among other difficulties, and therefore presents a scenario where the 
way firms organize to arrive at judgments and decisions plays a vital role. 
Drawing on the literature on cognition, we define decision-making styles as the degree to 
which firms emphasize analytical decision making in strategic decision-processes. Decisions 
made in a highly-analytical manner are often slower and based on a lengthier information search 
as opposed to those made in a low-analytical style, and due to this variation we expect different 
styles to be suitable for different aspects of innovative performance. Thus, instead of focusing on 
a single aspect of innovative performance –as often done in innovation studies (Tether, 2000) – 
we distinguish between two dimensions of innovation: scale and quality. We propose a 
mediation model in which firms’ decision-making style acts as a mediator linking the effect of 
firm size on these two dimensions of innovative performance. By framing this relation as a 
mediation model, we empirically explore (a) how firm size affects decision-making styles, (b) 
how decision-making styles differently affect the two dimensions of innovative performance, and 
finally, (c) whether firm size continues to affect the two dimensions of innovative performance 
after decision-making styles are accounted for. 
Exploring these relations is an important area of research for several reasons. First, while 
there is much evidence from laboratory experiments linking decision-making style and task 
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performance at the individual-level (Hogarth, 1987, 2005) little is known about the impact of 
decision-styles on organizational-level outcomes (Khatri and Ng, 2000). Second, management 
teams in modern organizations of all sizes appear to have increasing information demands and 
this situation calls for a better understanding of how firms process and organize information 
(Sadler-Smith, 2004). Third, the question of whether firms should emphasize an analytical 
approach to strategic decision making has puzzled researchers for many years (Dane and Pratt, 
2007). In parallel with this, firms increasingly spend large sums of money on analytical tools for 
strategic decision making, a trend that is evidenced by the explosive growth in expenditures in 
the information technology industries since the 1970s, which now exceed two trillion dollars 
annually (Ryan, Harrison and Schkade, 2002), but despite this tendency, we know little about the 
effect of analytically-inclined decisions on innovation. Finally, we change the way we look at 
firm size, not as a static characteristic of firms at a given time, but rather as a feature that reflects 
evolution in organizational capabilities. Firm size is a construct worthy of theoretical attention 
because firms of different sizes have different patterns of practices (Wally and Baum, 2003), and 
different repertoires of actions available to the individuals involved (Fiegenbaum and Karnani, 
1991). Therefore, understanding how decision-making capabilities change with size can help 
managers identify the links between organizational structure and innovative productivity. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Although research on innovation focuses mainly on the technological aspects of production, it 
also stresses the cognitive nature of the organizational structure of the firm. As a result, this 
perspective has portrayed the firm as an information-processing organism that has the ability to 
adapt (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The emphasis on cognition is crucial in a world where decision 
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makers have different perceptions of the environment and where acquisition of information, 
computation, codification, and communication are costly. Because information gathering and 
processing behaviors differ across organizational forms (Merz and Sauber, 1995), the size of 
firms becomes a variable of interest for understanding the cognitive styles of firms and their 
effect on organizational outcomes. Past research has regarded size as a mere organizational 
feature of firms at a given point in time, and has not paid much attention to size as an indicator of 
organizational evolution and to how it triggers internal changes that affect organizational 
outcomes. Yet, as firms become larger, they experience changes in the gathering and processing 
of information (Smeltzer et al., 1988), and, more importantly, in the manner in which members 
arrive at judgments and decisions (Smith et al., 1988). The conception of firm size proposed 
herein—as a dynamic variable affecting organizational outcomes by triggering specific styles of 
thinking and deciding—changes how we look at firm size because it is not the size of firms per 
se, but rather the internal processes activated as firms evolve in size that are proposed to affect 
outcomes. 
Next, before proposing how firm size affect decision-making styles and how decision-
making styles affect innovative performance, we briefly review the literature linking firm size 
with R&D productivity. 
 
Firm size and R&D productivity 
Most research in R&D productivity has looked at firms’ degree of innovativeness as measured 
by innovation counts or innovation counts standardized by the number of employees or R&D 
investments. In this stream of research, many studies report an advantage in R&D productivity 
for large firms. Earlier explanations for this finding point to the existence of complementarities 
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between R&D and other functional activities such as marketing or the production process 
(Cohen, 1995); economies of scale and scope (Nooteboom, 1994; Dimas, Grabowski and 
Vernon, 1995); cost-spreading advantages because large firms can spread R&D expenditures 
over their increasing output and thereby enhance returns to R&D (Cohen and Klepper, 1996); the 
ability to maintain a diverse portfolio of R&D projects; and greater capacity to absorb internal 
and external knowledge spillovers (Henderson and Cockburn, 1997). Although the empirical 
evidence fails to generate a consensus, several studies have found that small firms in 
manufacturing industries introduce a larger number of innovations per employee or unit of R&D 
investment than their larger counterparts (Bound, Cummings, Griliches, Hall and Adam, 1984; 
Hausman, Hall and Grilliches, 1984; Pavitt, Robson and Townsend, 1987; Acs and Audretsch, 
1991; Kleinknecht, Reijen and Smith, 1993; Santarelli and Piergiovanni, 1996). Supporters of 
this view assert that large firms are less R&D-productive than smaller ones because of a lower 
marginal control and higher bureaucratic controls (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  
Yet, interpretations based on innovation counts assume that the value or quality of 
innovations is equally distributed across size categories (Tether, 1998, 2000). Few studies have 
attempted to approximate qualitative aspects of innovations beyond simple counts, and a careful 
examination of the literature hints at the possibility of an advantage for large over small firms. 
Dimasi et al. (1995) find that sales derived from product innovations were more than fivefold 
greater for large firms. Tether (1998), using the amount of sales derived from innovations, finds 
that large firms were three times as innovative as smaller firms. Laursen and Salter (2006) also 
find that larger firms have greater sales of new products and that small companies show an even 
lower performance in breakthrough innovations. Although it appears that small firms are more-
productive innovators when count metrics are used, large firms appear to be more R&D 
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productive in terms of returns on R&D and in the overall quality of the innovations they produce. 
However, research exploring the qualitative aspects of innovation remains negligible compared 
to the vast literature using innovation counts, and therefore no definite conclusions can be drawn. 
Nonetheless, these results suggest that firms in different size categories do not share the same 
objective functions concerning innovative output. A possible explanation for this divergence may 
lie in the internal changes that firms experience as they transform from small businesses to large 
organizations. We propose that as firm size increases, the innovation process in firms represents 
a conscious choice to aim for high-quality innovations as opposed to a large scale of average 
innovations. 
 
Two dimensions of R&D productivity: scale and quality of innovative output 
Evaluating and comparing organizations’ R&D productivity is a complex task because R&D 
processes are risky, uncertain, characterized by a long gestation period, and have multiple output 
parameters. Although a simple count of the number of innovations may approximate the scale of 
an organization’s innovative capabilities, it ignores important qualitative aspects such as its 
ability to generate financial returns from investments in R&D (Narin, Noma and Perry, 1987; 
Schoenecker and Swanson, 2002). Although empirical evidence from previous work suggests 
that scale and quality of innovation are not correlated to each other (Narin et al., 1987, 
Schoenecker and Swanson, 2002), the origins of this independence or the causal factors 
influencing each dimension remain unquestioned. In this essay we will conceptually refer to 
scale as any measure of innovation counts, and we expand the extant notion of quality to include 
returns on R&D investments that capture the monetary gains derived from innovative output. 
Other things being equal, a firm will be more R&D productive in scale if it produces a larger 
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number of innovations per unit of R&D investment and will be more R&D productive in quality 
if its innovations generate more financial gains. We believe it is important to propagate this 
distinction, not only to better understand firms’ innovative activity, but also to appreciate how 
the internal mechanisms arising in firms of different size can yield diverse outcomes. 
Small firms tend to be more vulnerable to changing environments than larger ones, and 
expansion through increased product innovation is an essential strategy for their viability in 
manufacturing industries (Penrose, 1980). For small firms in general, successful performance is 
often interpreted as growth in size, and such outcomes are often achieved through product 
innovation (Rao and Drazin, 2002). Growth-oriented strategies, which small firms frequently 
adopt, have explained product innovation (Vaona and Pianta, 2008) as opposed to value-oriented 
strategies pursued by larger firms. Similarly, product innovation has improved the survival 
chances of small, entrepreneurial firms through extended innovative periods when they 
experiment with new products (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt and Lyman, 1990). Consequently, it is 
believed that survival of small firms may call for a stream of innovations to increase the scale of 
innovations introduced per unit of R&D investment (Siegel, Siegel and MacMilan, 1993) as 
opposed to value-creating strategies adopted by large firms. In contrast, profitability measures 
such as return on investment and return on equity are more commonly used as metrics of success 
for larger firms (Garnsey, 1998). Because of this argument, it is suggested that large firms focus 
on the quality of innovations rather than on the scale of the portfolio of new products, while 
small firms favor the scale of innovative output. Therefore, this distinction between scale and 
quality can help improve our understanding of the size-R&D productivity relationship, and, 
likewise, it will provide a starting point to analyze how decision-making approaches mediate the 
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effect of size on these two dimensions of R&D productivity. Following the arguments above, we 
suggest that size is linked to R&D productivity in the following way: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Firm size and R&D productivity in terms of scale of innovative output are 
negatively related. 
Hypothesis 1B: Firm size and R&D productivity in terms of quality of innovative output are 
positively related. 
 
Decision-making styles 
One of the underexplored but potentially critical factors influencing the relationship between 
firm size and the two dimensions of R&D productivity is the style in which organizations 
approach strategic decisions. There is a growing consensus that a useful distinction can be made 
between two styles thinking and deciding (Dane and Pratt, 2007), also referred to as cognitive 
strategies (Hogarth, 2005) or cognitive styles (Sadler-Smith, 2004). On the one hand, there exists 
an analytical style of reasoning, also called “rational” or “deliberate,” which is usually described 
as effortful, slow, abstract, based on language, conscious, explicit, computational, and rule 
governed. On the other hand, there is a nonanalytical style, also referred to as “intuitive,” 
“experiential,” or “tacit,” which is described as effortless, rapid, nonexplicit, unconscious, and 
producing approximate responses.  
Although decision-making styles have been considered to be individual differences 
(Schunk and Betsch, 2005), they have also been found to depend on contextual factors 
(Hammond, 1996). Certain characteristics of a task, like the availability of detailed analytical 
information, may promote deliberate analysis, whereas others, like feedback or time pressure, 
may promote rapid response. Also, the notion that decision making comprises analytical and 
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nonanalytical components is broadly accepted and relates to most people’s everyday decisions 
(Epstein, 1994). It is important to stress that both mechanisms are simultaneously involved in 
most decisions. Some theorists emphasize the idea of a single continuum featuring intuitive 
reasoning at one extreme and analytical reasoning on the other, leaving a number of styles in 
between (Agor, 1989; Hammond, 1996). However, dual-process theorists have converged on the 
notion that analytical and intuitive styles represent two conceptually independent continuums 
that decision makers use simultaneously and interactively (Epstein, 1994; Hodgkinson and 
Sadler-Smith, 2003). Given that we cannot assess intuition per se at the organizational level with 
the data available in this study, we will focus on the degree to which firms increasingly 
emphasize analytical decision making (defined in greater detail later). Such operationalization of 
decision-making styles excludes the possibility of testing dual-process arguments but will enable 
us to identify the firms’ positions in the analytical continuum. Highly analytical firms will lie 
close to one extreme, and low-analytical firms will lie close to the opposite extreme. Under this 
viewpoint, firms that base their R&D decisions on numerous information tools such as detailed 
R&D plans, sophisticated indexes, and scientific information, among other hard data, complete a 
highly analytical decision process, whereas managers completing a low-analytical process move 
away from this end of the continuum, basing their decisions on their own subjective judgments 
and disregarding exhaustive information support.  
Managers often use analytical tools to double-check judgments based on impressions or 
quick associations, especially when there is no time pressure (Dane and Pratt, 2007). Yet, in the 
particular situation of judgments about the potential attractiveness of an invention, or the 
likelihood of a new product’s being accepted by the public, it may not always be easy to overrule 
rapid judgments by analysis, because that consumes time and resources. Such decision situations 
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require managers to engage in cognitively demanding activities (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). As 
a result, management teams facing R&D decisions may choose to deal with uncertainty in 
different ways, and the degree to which they emphasize one decision-making style or the other 
may cause variations in the outcomes of the R&D process. 
 
Firm size and decision-making styles  
A key distinctive feature in the management of small firms is their quicker and more nimble 
operation due to structural simplicity, which increases their ability to quickly respond to the 
dynamics of the environment. (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Unlike managers in large firms, 
managers in small firms as well as entrepreneurs manifest greater reliance on decision heuristics, 
which can be an effective guide to managerial decision making under conditions of uncertainty 
(Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Houghton, Simon, Aquino and Goldberg, 2000; Forbes, 2005). 
Similarly, existing research shows that small firms follow more-flexible (Fiegenbaum and 
Karnani, 1991), faster (Wally and Buam, 2003), and less-technocratic decision processes 
(Lindsay and Rue, 1980) than those followed by large firms. 
In contrast, large firms tend to make decisions in a more-planned and more-formal 
manner (Miller et al., 1988) than small firms. For example, Huang et al. (2002) reveals that large 
firms planning new-product developments rely on written and explicit plans that are followed 
step-by-step, as opposed to small firms in which planning is often reduced to informal 
conversations. Another reason for a lower reliance on analytical tools is that small firms carrying 
out innovative activities often do so without many financial and managerial resources (Santarelli 
and Sterlacchini, 1990). Also, as firms increase in size, managers become subject to closer 
monitoring by the firm’s board of directors, shareholders, and institutional investors, who expect 
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decision making to be based on justifiable arguments. Therefore, managers are likely to search 
for objective information to support their decisions, which leads large corporations to adopt a 
highly analytical style. Therefore, in order to support their decisions and to avoid risks, managers 
in large corporations are likely to promote exhaustive information search, detailed planning, 
formal procedures, and in doing so, decision processes become more analytical. Conversely, 
managers in small firms may not experience this type of pressure and have more freedom to 
make key decisions based on personalized judgments without having to acquire expensive 
information to back their decisions.  
In parallel with the literature on cognition, we propose that managerial configurations 
promoting higher decision speed, flexibility, informality, and heuristic driven decision processes 
are likely to reflect a rather low analytical decision-making style while configurations promoting 
exhaustive information search, structured planning schemes, formality, and technocratic-driven 
decision processes reflect high analytical decision-making styles. Because these configurations 
tend to vary with size, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms’ decision-making style becomes increasingly analytical with size. 
 
Decision-making styles and R&D productivity 
Despite the escalating emphasis on analytical tools to aid decision making in firms, there is a 
long-standing question in management research of whether increasing emphasis on analytical 
decision making is synonymous of improvements in managerial action, especially in uncertain 
situations (Sadler-Smith, 2004). We suggest that the emphasis placed on an analytical style 
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affects R&D through a number of mechanisms, some of which are preferable for R&D 
productivity from a scale and others from a quality standpoint. 
Decision-Making Style and the Scale of Innovative Output. Several aspects of a highly 
analytical style bound the scale of innovative output. First, firms relying heavily on analytical 
tools for innovation-related decisions incur excessive expenditures for information acquisition to 
aid their decisions. These tools considerably increase the costs of the R&D process without 
necessarily incrementing the amount of innovation in the same proportion (Cohen and Klepper, 
1996). Therefore, substantial investments in analytical tools can be seen as fixed costs that are 
incurred every time an R&D project is pursued, and this posits a constraint on the number of 
R&D projects that an organization can support. Second, in addition to inflating the costs of the 
R&D process, currently available information is often of little help for the successful 
development of future opportunities (Sine, Haveman and Tolbert, 2005). The entrepreneurship 
literature supports the idea that entrepreneurial opportunities, such as new-product developments, 
often follow a messy, nonlinear, tacit, and socially complex process and that the associated 
outcomes can rarely be known beforehand, meaning that there is little useful pre-existing 
information related to finding new opportunities to exploit (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). 
Therefore, a highly analytical style may not be as well suited for the development of numerous 
new ideas as the cognitive shortcuts often used in situations characterized by information 
shortage, high uncertainty, and high time pressure (Baron, 1998). Third, in a situation 
characterized by meager information, strategic decision processes stressing sequential, 
systematic, and step-by-step procedures based on an exhaustive information search, are time-
consuming. Eisenhardt (1990) observed that executives who were able to keep their 
organizations on pace with the rate of change in their operating environments were likely to 
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discard analytical procedures as a primary basis for making key strategic decisions. In contrast, 
decision makers who were less effective and slower tended to emphasize formal, technocratic 
approaches to decision making. Analytical decision-making styles decrease the speed of decision 
processes, not only because it takes time to acquire information, but also because it takes time to 
analyze it. These obstacles to speedy decisions hinder the successful development of new 
opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1990). In a world where product life cycles are shortening, fast 
decision making is key to delivering new products to the market in a sustained fashion. Fourth, 
the reliance on analytical decision making can improve managers’ perceptions of the risks 
involved in entrepreneurial opportunities (Keh, Foo and Lim, 2002). Managers selecting among 
several courses of action have to evaluate the risks of each alternative, and reluctance to examine 
an extensive amount of information may lead to underestimating potential risks. Several studies 
have emphasized the importance of lowered risk perception as a catalyst of engagement in risky 
actions, such as first-moving behavior (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998), innovation, or even 
new-venture creation (Simon and Houghton, 1999). Studies examining on-the-field decisions 
regarding product innovation have found that managers disregarding analytical mechanisms have 
a lower perception of risks involved in strategic decisions and consequently present a higher 
commitment to innovation (Simon and Houghton, 2003). Scholars in this field have evaluated 
the presence of heuristics in managerial decision making that appear to reduce risk perception 
(Forbes, 2005; Houghton et al., 2000; Busenitz and Barney, 1997). Although a highly analytical 
style can lead to an enhanced assessment of risks, it keeps decision makers from easily engaging 
in various R&D projects and can consequently reduce the potential number of new-product 
developments. Because of the above mentioned mechanisms, we claim that an analytical style is 
inadequate for the introduction of a consistently large number of new products. 
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Hypothesis 3A: The more analytical the decision-making style, the lower the R&D 
productivity in terms of scale. 
 
Decision-Making Style and Quality of Innovative Output. Conversely, firms can expect to 
benefit from emphasizing an analytical decision-making style by developing products of higher 
quality at the expense of a reduced innovative output. Although approaching R&D decisions in a 
highly analytical manner is costly, it ensures a more-comprehensive information set from which 
to draw more-accurate inferences. Useful preexisting information related to exploiting new 
opportunities is rarely available (Alvarez and Barney, 2005), but constant investments in 
information search and extensive market analyses can ultimately provide some sort of advantage 
to firms. The better insight gained by acquiring and analyzing information related to a specific 
R&D project can improve the assessment of potential new products and lead to a better match 
between product and expectations in the market.  
Moreover, the speed in new-product development is also likely to affect the product 
quality. Research on the determinants of product quality shows that rapid development can 
compromise the final quality of a new product (Crawford, 1992). Increased decision speed is 
associated with time pressure and, when taken to extreme situations, might call for excessive 
shortcuts in the decision-making process that in turn lead to narrow sets of alternatives and 
diminish the chances of selecting the optimal alternative. Thus, slow decision making can 
promote higher-quality output.  
At the same time, by having a fine-grained perception of the risks, analytical decision 
makers can apply an effective screening process that allows canceling R&D projects that have a 
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higher likelihood of failure, and they can chose to pursue only those projects presenting 
promising prospects. An increased risk perception derived from extensive analytical procedures 
is desirable to improve the ultimate product quality by removing potential sources of uncertainty 
and can certainly be worth the investments. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3B: The more analytical the decision-making style, the higher the R&D 
productivity in terms of quality. 
 
The mediating role of decision-making style 
The way firms approach R&D decisions is proposed to be a function of the size of firms. With 
size, firms change the stresses on outcomes of innovation from scale to quality. Managers in 
small firms are able to arrive at strategic decisions in a more-unstructured, flexible, fast, and 
spontaneous manner that leads to a rapid development of new ideas favoring innovation. In this 
stage, there is an initial hypothesis of how to arrive at a final product, rather than a fully 
elaborated strategic plan, and this tendency stems less from a calculated choice out of a number 
of known alternatives, but more from a process of sequential adaptation to new possibilities 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002).  
As firms grow in size, this adaptation becomes more rigid, because information is filtered 
through a logic that is established from previous successes. Likewise, the knowledge flow 
diminishes, hierarchical structures become larger, and the number of stakeholders (e.g., 
bondholders, employees, or customers) increases. These obstacles increase the need for 
standardized information-sharing mechanisms that are obtained through a more-analytical 
decision environment. In turn, the increasingly analytical style adopted by large firms increases 
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the perception of risks and enables decision makers to filter out potential failing R&D projects 
(Christensen, 1997). Through this process, large firms increase control over current innovation 
processes and become more efficient at exploiting existing ideas, while they are discouraged 
from searching new ones (Benner and Tushman, 2002). This trend, coupled with the pressure 
exerted by the board of directors, shareholders, and investors, leads managers to pay less 
attention to the development of new products and more attention to maximizing benefits from 
existing ones, which simultaneously promotes the use of analytical decision tools as filters.  In 
sum, we propose that the relation between firm size and R&D productivity is mediated by 
decision-making style: 
 
Hypothesis 4A: Decision-making style mediates the negative relation between firm size 
and R&D productivity in terms of scale. 
Hypothesis 4B: Decision-making style mediates the positive relation between firm size 
and R&D productivity in terms of quality. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Sample and data  
In our empirical analysis we use longitudinal data from the Spanish Business Strategy Survey 
(SBSS), an annual survey of a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms conducted 
by the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce. Firms in the sample represent 20 
industrial sectors according to the NACE-Rev.1 classification (National Classification of 
Economic Activities, revised in year 1993). Because only companies in manufacturing sectors 
were surveyed, the industrial background is fairly comparable, and results may be generalizable 
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to a wide range of industrial sectors. A unique characteristic of this survey is that it has a section 
in which CEOs are asked about the procedures and tools used for decision making during the 
R&D process, which is crucial to this study and serves as the basis for capturing the different 
decision-making styles used by firms. Contrary to other data sets, the SBSS is not restricted to 
the analysis of firms’ technological activities and its focus goes beyond innovation-intensive 
firms, encompassing a more complete picture. The SBSS survey started collecting data in 1990, 
but the section relating to R&D decision making was included in the survey only in 1998, so our 
sample ranges from 1998 to 2004. Respondents to the SBSS survey were CEOs, and data were 
collected using direct interviewers supported by a questionnaire. Because some firms stopped 
providing information during the sample period for several reasons, including mergers, changes 
to nonindustrial activity, or shutdown of the production process, we have an unbalanced panel. In 
order to minimize the problems caused by missing data, only firms with at least three continuous 
years of data availability were selected. This results in an unbalanced panel of 614 firms, 
consisting of 1415 firm-year observations. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on three variables 
from the dataset –age, number of employees, and number of innovations reported no significant 
differences between firms included in the analyses and those left outside. The distribution of the 
sample with respect to size is reasonably equitable: 42% of the firms are small (200 or fewer 
employees), and 58% are large. The distribution of the sample crosses the 20 industrial sectors. 
The chemicals, motor vehicles, machines and mechanical equipment, and food and tobacco 
sectors rank among the most populated sectors, which coincides with the actual distribution of 
Spanish manufacturing firms.  
 
Measures 
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Because we are going to control for total R&D expenditures in the regression analyses, each of 
the dependent variables in our models will feature one of the dimensions of innovative output. 
Therefore, the analyses will report the effect of the antecedent, mediator, and control variables 
on the scale and quality of innovative output conditional on the amount invested in R&D. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Scaleit. The variable accounting for the quantitative aspect of innovative output, scaleit, is 
measured by the number of new products developed by firm i in year t. An advantage of this 
measure is that, in our data, the number of new products developed is directly related to 
inventiveness: They are recognized as new products only if they are completely different from 
previous product lines or if they are substantial modifications from previous products. The 
number of new products measures not only a firm’s ability to introduce new products in the 
market but also its ability to upgrade current ones. Also, this measure is closely related to similar 
measures of innovative strength such as patents (Scherer and Ross, 1990), sales growth (Scherer, 
1983), and invention counts (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). The ability to produce multiple product 
innovations is critical in high-velocity environments and is considered a key indicator of 
innovative performance (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). 
Qualityit. The dependent variable approximating the quality of the innovative output in 
the sense of returns-on-R&D-investments, is assessed by the licensing revenue obtained from 
innovations by firm i in year t. For many industries, licensing revenue is the primary reason for 
their innovation activity, and the growth in licensing revenue has increased substantially over the 
past 20 years (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). On the one hand, large companies usually have a 
technology group that handles all their licensing activities and therefore have an incentive to use 
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licensing to generate income. On the other hand, licensing can be a great revenue model for 
small firms that usually do not have the resources to enter, or effectively compete in, their target 
markets, or where their technology is applicable to a number of industries. Licensing of new 
ideas can enable firms to enter new markets relatively quickly with little or no risks, such as 
going into foreign markets. Licensing can also be an advantage to firms by providing an 
opportunity to establish industry standards and to deter entry (Gallini, 1984). Through cross-
licensing, firms can gain greater freedom to develop new products and compete in new markets 
without worrying about potential litigation. Additional incentives to licensing include the 
selection of competitors (Rockett, 1990). Arora and Fosfuri (2003) suggest that licensing activity 
in the product market limits the negative impact of competitors’ licenses while increasing total 
revenues of firms.  
 
Antecedent Variable 
Sizeit. To measure the size of firms, we use the log of number of employees instead of other 
commonly used measures such as log of sales, which highly correlates with other control 
variables like R&D expenditures. This measure of size is more stable across time than other 
measures based on sales, which are more volatile and sensitive to macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Mediator Variable 
Decision-making styleit . To capture the decision-making style of firms by the degree to which 
firm i relies on analytical tools for R&D decision-making purposes at time t, we built a 
composite measure using four items. Data were gathered from a section of the SBSS survey in 
which CEOs are asked to answer yes or no to a series of items, each of which represents a 
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different tool or procedure used during the R&D process. Because composite measures quantify 
complex concepts more adequately than single indicators, we selected four of these items from a 
total of six available and added them up with equal weighting to create a rank-ordering variable 
that approximates the continuum-like nature of the analytical construct. This measure takes a 
minimum value of zero and a maximum of four. Firms with the maximum score are assumed to 
follow a highly analytical style, and as firms move away from the maximum score, they are 
assumed to become less analytically oriented for R&D decision making. The first item captures 
whether firms formally establish an R&D committee and a detailed R&D plan to guide their 
R&D process. Firms establishing a formal R&D plan and committee are likely to undertake 
formal planning, which entails deliberation, examination of many alternatives, and selection of 
an optimal strategy and therefore resembles an analytical approach to decision making. The 
second dummy measures whether firms acquire scientific information to improve their R&D 
projects. Scientific information such as exhaustive research reports or insights about state-of-the-
art technologies augments the information pool of decision makers. This type of information is 
likely to be specific and not vague, meaning that it requires analytical skills to manipulate and 
thus use it. The third dummy variable reports whether firms collaborate with universities. 
Collaborating with universities may reduce the firm’s risk in the development process of a new 
product and may enhance the firm’s final decisions according to the advice of experts, so firms 
collaborating with universities are assumed to approach decisions more analytically than those 
not collaborating. The fourth dummy reports whether firms evaluate the perspectives of 
technological opportunities during the R&D process. The evaluation of technological 
opportunities may reduce the uncertainty regarding R&D investments and, therefore, evaluating 
the potential profitability of an innovation project renders the R&D decision-making process 
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more analytical. All these items point in the same direction, so that the presence or use of any of 
these procedures renders the R&D process more analytical in that firms need to make use of 
analytical skills, devote time and cognitive efforts, and process hard data to use them 
successfully. A reasonably high Cronbach’s alpha (.76) confirmed the internal consistency of this 
construct, and an exploratory factor analysis revealed that a single factor underlies the four items 
(only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one), supporting the fact that the composite 
measure is unidimensional. Because the components of composite measures need to be 
independent so that variation in one component does not directly drive another, we dropped two 
of the six initially available items that correlated strongly to other items and thus provided 
redundant information. The discarded items measured whether firms evaluated alternative 
technologies and whether they elaborated innovation indexes. 
Figure 1 shows firms’ reliance on analytical tools for R&D decision making according to 
their size. Note that most large firms rely more frequently on four or five analytical tools, 
whereas small firms tend to rely on zero or one. Here we can see the propensity of large firms to 
follow highly analytical decision making as opposed to small firms’ propensity to overlook 
analytically intensive procedures. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the percentage of firms using each decision tool. The 
most commonly used tool is the formation of an R&D committee (70%), and the least used is 
scientific information (45%). For the four items, large firms have a higher frequency of use than 
smaller ones. Table 2 presents a tabulation of decision-making style versus both dimensions of 
R&D productivity. We split the two dependent variables by their median values into high and 
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Figure 1. Reliance on analytical tools by firm size 
 
 
low. While firms that introduce a high number of innovations per unit of R&D investment tend 
to disregard analytical tools (58% of all high-scale firms use no tools), high-quality innovators 
present the opposite trend (54% of all high-quality innovators use three or four tools). Overall, 
these trends point to the possibility that the decision-making style may be driving innovation 
outcomes independent of firm size. 
  
Table 1.  Reliance on each analytical tool by firm size category, in % of firms 
 
  
  
R&D committee  Scientific info. University Perspective tech.  
> 200 employees   82 57 63 62 
< 200 employees   53 29 30 47 
All firms   70 45 49 56 
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Table 2.  Distribution of analytical tools by each dimension of R&D productivity, in % of firms 
 
  
Scale/total R&D 
 
Quality/total R&D 
 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
Decision-
making 
style 
0 17.3 58.8  0 24.8 6.8 
1 18.6 20.6  1 22.6 19.4 
2 22.1 11.8  2 20.1 19.7 
3 23 8.8  3 18.3 36.7 
4 19 0.0  4 14.2 17.3 
 
 100 100  100 100 
 
 
Control Variables 
Because we are interested in R&D productivity, we control for R&D expenditures of firms 
lagged one period so variations in the scale and quality of innovative output are conditional on 
R&D expenditures. We control for possible macroeconomic and business cycle shocks common 
to all industrial sectors, using time dummies for all the years in the sample, as well as time-
invariant shocks, using industry dummies reflecting the 20 different industrial sectors. We 
include firm age measured by the log of age, which controls for the experience of firms. We also 
control for environmental volatility in the product market following Sorenson’s (2003) approach. 
This measure uses the correlation in sales from period t to period t-1. Product sales represent 
relatively stable attributes, so consumers should consume the same products from one period to 
the next if they prefer the same attributes, meaning that a high correlation between periods 
reflects low volatility, while low correlation signals higher volatility. By inverting the resulting 
correlation, increasing values indicate greater volatility rather than greater stability. Finally, to 
control for firm heterogeneity, we construct a presample variable according to the type of 
dependent variable, where in the case of scale, the presample variable represents the sum of 
product innovations obtained by a firm in the three years prior to the firm’s entry into the sample, 
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whereas in the case of quality, it represents the sum of the log of licensing revenue accumulated 
in the three years prior to the firm’s entry into the sample.  
 
Methodology 
A correctly specified mediation model has to define a causal order and direction, for which 
temporal precedence of causal factors is essential (Mathieu, DeShon and Bergh, 2008). To 
account for temporal precedence of variables, we follow a “distributed lags” procedure (Ahuja 
and Lampert, 2001). The distributed lags enable us to assess the time pattern of the effects of 
firm size on decision-making style, and of decision-making style on R&D productivity, for 
several subsequent periods. By assessing firms’ size in different time periods, we avoid a static 
representation of size and capture the effect of firms’ size evolution. Nonetheless, the distributed 
lags may be statistically inconsequential in any one period (Ahuja and Katila, 2001) because 
their net impact is likely to be distributed over several periods.  
We develop a mediation model in two stages. First, we test whether firm size causally 
affects decision-making style. In this step, the dependent variable is decision-making style at 
time t, and as explanatory variables, we include distributed lags of size at times t-1, t-2, t-3, and 
t-4. The second stage of the mediation model reports the effect of decision-making style on two 
dimensions of R&D productivity. In this part of the model we use distributed lags of decision-
making style at times t-1, t-2, and t-3, while the dependent variables remain at time t. Because in 
the second stage of the model we will have two dependent variables, we will use two different 
econometric specifications in this stage. Finally, in the second stage of the model we also include 
firm size to observe how it affects R&D productivity when decision-making style is accounted 
for in the regressions. The firm size variable is lagged one period preceding the mediator, t-4, to 
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maintain temporal precedence of causal factors. To establish mediation, we follow Baron’s and 
Kenny’s (1986) steps, by which size must affect the mediator (decision-making style) in the first 
stage and then the mediator affects the dependent variables in the second stage. We should 
observe that the effects of size on the dependent variables are weaker or nonexistent when the 
mediator is accounted for. 
 
Model Specification 
The dependent variable in the first stage, decision-making style, takes nonnegative integer values 
from zero to four. Because the assumptions of the linear regression model do not hold with this 
type of data, an ordered probit regression approach is the preferred way to capture the ordinal 
ranking of the dependent variable (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975), and, in this case, our variable 
ranks the degree to which firms emphasize analytical decision making during the R&D process. 
The proposed model is: 
γββββ 144332211 −−−−− ++++= itititititit XSSSSD ,     (1) 
where itD  is the number of analytical tools used for decision making by firm i in year t; yearitS − is 
the vector of lags for firm size in years t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4; and 1−itX  is the vector of controls 
affecting decision-making style. 
In the second stage of the mediation model, the first dependent variable is the number of 
new products developed. Because this is a count outcome variable taking nonnegative integers, a 
regression approach for Poisson data is suitable. We specified the following regression model: 
)exp( 13322114 γβββ −−−−− ++++= itititititit XDDDSP  ,    (2) 
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where itP  is the number of new products obtained by firm i in year t, 4−itS  is the size of firms in 
t-4, yearitD −  is the lagged vector of decision-making style variables for years t-1 to t-3, and 1−itX  
is a vector of control variables affecting itP . This specification implies that the scale of new 
products introduced by any firm in any given year is randomly distributed following a Poisson 
process, where 4−itS , the covariate vectors 1−itX , and decision-making style at t-1, t-2, and t-3 
determine the mean of this process. We assume that the impact of using analytical tools is likely 
to extend over a number of years; thus, we use the distributed lags approach to capture the 
distributed impact of decision-making style in different periods. This specification does not deal 
with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, which may generate overdispersion in the data. 
To address this issue, we follow the Presample Panel Poisson procedure (Blundell, Griffith and 
Van Reenen, 1995) by including a presample variable that accounts for the stock of new-product 
innovations developed over the three years prior to the sample. Thus, this variable serves as a 
fixed effect of the firms’ ability to develop new products and controls for unobservable 
differences across firms. In addition, following Ahuja and Katila (2001) we apply the 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) methodology for estimating Poisson data because it 
accounts for remaining overdispersion and serial correlation even after we include a presample 
variable. Moreover, we correct for possible violations of the independence assumption of the 
independent variable by specifying an exchangeable correlation matrix, which assumes 
interdependence of subsequent observations of the dependent variable through time without 
imposing a specific type of correlation (Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, and Zeger, 2002). 
Examination of the reported revenues for licensing figures indicated significant skewness, 
so we transformed this measure using the natural log transformation qualityit = ln(1+ licensing 
revenueit). In regression analysis, high skewness can increase the risk of Type I and Type II 
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errors (Greene, 1999), and the natural log transformation has been proven to eliminate this 
problem. We used the transformation because the untransformed variable can naturally take 
value zero and the natural log of zero is undefined. We used Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(Greene, 1999), which allows for estimating parameters in the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Finally, we report results with robust or White-Huber standard errors. The 
model is as follows: 
γβββ 13322114 −−−−− ++++= itititititit XDDDSQ ,     (3) 
where itQ  is the log of licensing revenue of firm i in year t, 4−itS  is the size of firms in t-4, 
yearitD −  is the lagged vector of decision-making style variables for years t-1 to t-3, and 1−itX  is a 
vector of control variables affecting itQ . We also include a presample variable accounting for the 
accumulated licensing revenue from three years previous to the inclusion in the sample. 
 
Results 
Table 3 provides basic statistics for all the variables in the analysis. The means of our dependent 
variables are 2.54 for scale and 0.24 for quality, while the mean score for decision-making style 
is 2.04. Apart from the expected high correlations between variables and their respective 
distributed lags, we observe moderately high correlations between logR&Dt-1 and sizet-1 (0.67), 
sizet-2 (0.67), sizet-3 (0.66), and sizet-4 (0.65). Robustness tests indicate that these high correlations 
did not affect the results of the hypothesized effects.  
Table 4 shows the results for the first stage of the mediation model, where decision-
making style is regressed against firm size. Table 5 reports the second part of the mediation 
model, where the two dimensions of R&D productivity serve as dependent variables. Models 1, 
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2, and 3 in Table 5 show the presample panel regression using GEE Poisson estimators, and 
Models 4, 5, and 6 report the presample panel regressions with GLS estimators.  
In Hypothesis 1A we predicted a negative relationship between firm size and R&D 
productivity in terms of scale. The coefficient for size reported in Model 1 in Table 5, shows a 
negative and significant effect on scale. This result indicates support for Hypothesis 1A and 
provides additional evidence for the often-observed relation between firm size and declining 
new-product development. Hypothesis 1B predicted a positive relationship between firm size and 
R&D productivity in terms of quality. Model 4 shows that size has a positive and significant 
effect on quality, meaning that the innovative output of large firms is of higher quality in terms 
of return-to-investments than that of smaller firms. This finding supports Hypothesis 1B and is in 
line with our initial statement about the possibility that the hypothesized negative relation 
between new-product development and size holds at the expense of the quality of the innovations 
developed. Note however, that the relationship between size and quality is not as strong as that 
between size and scale. 
In Hypothesis 2 we predicted a positive relationship between size and decision-making 
style. The ordered probit estimation reported in Table 4 shows the positive and significant effect 
of firm size on decision-making style, implying that firms become increasingly analytical in their 
decision-making style as they evolve in size. Model 1 shows the regression of decision-making 
style on control variables, with a pseudo-R2 of 0.037. Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 report a positive and 
significant effect of the four distributed lags of size on decision-making style, which improves 
the overall fit, as reported by a pseudo-R2 above 0.13. Model 6 includes the four distributed lags 
simultaneously and the overall effect is absorbed by the first lag, which is positive and
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Table 3.  Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables 
 
  Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Scale 2.450 18.70 
             2 Quality 0.245 1.66 0.09* 
3 Size t-1 4.340 1.49 0.07* 0.18* 
4 Size t-2 4.327 1.49 0.07* 0.18* 0.99* 
5 Size t-3 4.311 1.50 0.07* 0.18* 0.98* 0.99* 
6 Size t-4 4.304 1.51 0.07* 0.18* 0.97* 0.98* 0.99* 
7 Decision-making stylet-1 0.991 1.30 0.07* 0.15* 0.53* 0.54* 0.54* 0.54* 
8 Decision-making stylet-2 0.992 1.30 0.07* 0.15* 0.53* 0.53* 0.54* 0.54* 0.83* 
9 Decision-making stylet-3 0.998 1.31 0.06* 0.14* 0.53* 0.53* 0.54* 0.54* 0.75* 0.81* 
10 Log(R&D)t-1 11.206 2.31 0.02 0.23* 0.67* 0.67* 0.66* 0.65* 0.36* 0.37* 0.36* 
11 Log(age) 2.941 0.84 0.05* 0.12* 0.33* 0.34* 0.34* 0.35* 0.19* 0.19* 0.20* 0.22* 
12 Volatility 0.023 0.02 0.02 0.01*  -0.07*  -0.07*  -0.08*  -0.07*  -0.05*  -0.04*  -0.05* -0.07  -0.01* 
13 PresampleScale 7.131 47.75 0.20* 0.05* 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.05 0.06* 0.01* 
14 Presamplequality 0.336 2.85 0.06* 0.72* 0.20 0.20* 0.19* 0.19* 0.18* 0.17* 0.16* 0.22 0.08* 0.00* 0.05* 
* Correlations are significant at p < 0.01.   
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Table 4.  First stage of mediation - ordered probit regression predicting decision-making style 
  Decision-making style 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Size t-1   0.441***    0.426*** 
   [0.008]    [0.064] 
Size t-2    0.439***   0.063 
    [0.136]   [0.087] 
Size t-3     0.434***  -0.049 
     [0.008]  [0.077] 
Size t-4      0.431*** 0.006 
      [0.009] [0.057] 
Industry controls (20 sectors) yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
Year controls  yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.037 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.135 0.141 
N 
  
1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 
† p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two tailed) 
 
 
significant. Because there is temporal precedence between size and decision-making style, a 
causal and directional link can be established between the two variables. This result supports 
Hypothesis 2 and establishes the first step mediation. Note also that the magnitude of the effect is 
strongest for size in period t-1 and diminishes as lags become more distant in time. 
In Hypothesis 3A we predicted a negative relationship between decision-making style and 
scale. In Model 2 in Table 6, the distributed lags of decision-making style present an overall 
negative effect on scale, since the sum of the lags is negative. The negative effect of distributed 
lags is persistent in Model 3, thus, Hypothesis 3A is supported. Hypothesis 3B suggested a 
positive relationship between decision-making style and quality. Model 5 in Table 5 presents the 
distributed lags of decision-making styles and shows statistical significance in the second lag, but 
not in the remaining ones, which affects quality in a positive direction. This positive link provides 
modest support for Hypothesis 3B and suggests that firms employing highly analytical decision 
making have higher chances of introducing innovations of above-average quality and that 
investments in analytical tools for decision making should therefore be expected to increase the 
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Table 5.  Second stage of mediation 
 
 GEE presample Poisson regression  GLS presample regression 
 Scale (number of product innovations)  Quality (log of licensing revenue) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Size t-4  -0.254***   -0.229***   0.070*  -0.007 
 [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.035]  [0.083] 
Decision-making style t-1  0.112*** 0.109***   0.019 0.019 
  [0.010] [0.011]   [0.045] [0.045] 
Decision-making style t-2   -0.040***  -0.032**    0.100* 0.102* 
  [0.009] [0.011]   [0.040] [0.042] 
Decision-making style t-3   -0.086***  -0.077***   -0.058 -0.058 
  [0.011] [0.012]   [0.057] [0.059] 
Log(R&D) t-1 0.334*** 0.220*** 0.315***   0.083*** 0.091* 0.094† 
 [0.010] [0.008] [0.010]  [0.023] [0.046] [0.050] 
Log(age) 0.177*** 0.160*** 0.196***   0.092* 0.213** 0.216** 
 [0.020] [0.018] [0.020]  [0.0437] [0.076] [0.081] 
Presample 0.0001  -0.0002** -0.0001  0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Volatility  -4.752***  -4.000***  -4.25***  1.050 -0.526 -0.557 
 [0.955] [0.846] [0.940]  [1.427] [2.212] [-2.216] 
Intercept  -5.806***  -5.591***  -5.865***  -0.537  -1.640**  -1.771** 
  [ 1.052] [0.979] [1.093]   [0.467] [0.502] [0.577] 
Industry controls  yes yes yes  yes Yes yes 
Year controls  yes yes yes  yes Yes yes 
        
R2     0.177 0.246 0.247 
Chi-squared 8546.08 7817.19 8370.3  604.27 70.8 71.20 
N 1415 1415 1415   1415 1415 1415 
† p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 (two tailed) 
 
 
quality, though not the quantity, of the innovative output. Finally, hypotheses 4A and 4B predict 
that decision-making style mediates the effect of size on scale and quality respectively. Model 3 
includes size together with the distributed lags of decision-making style, and we observe that the 
effect of size is mediated by decision-making style, as the magnitude of size decreases from -
0.254 in Model 1 to -0.229 in Model 3 once we account for decision-making style. This 
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mediation, however, is partial because size still significantly affects the dependent variable. 
Conversely, in Model 6, once size and decision-making style are included together, the effect of 
size becomes insignificant and the second lag of decision-making style consistently remains 
positive and significant. In this case, mediation is full because size no longer affects quality once 
the mediator variable is accounted for. These findings support Hypothesis 4A and Hypothesis 4B, 
as the variability that was previously explained by size becomes absorbed by decision-making 
style. For robustness we also tested the hypotheses using the log of sales as a metric of size, and 
the analyses yield consistent results in all the steps of the mediation model (results available from 
the authors).The controls do not report surprising results. Log(R&D) has a positive and 
significant effect on both dependent variables throughout every model, although the effect 
appears to be much stronger for scale than for quality. Overall, log(age) shows a positive and 
consistently significant effect on both dependent variables. While presamplequality is one of the 
strongest correlates in the quality regressions, presamplescale does not play a prominent role in 
explaining new-product development and has a significant role only in Model 2, where it has a 
negative sign. Finally, volatility seems to have a negative effect on the dependent variables, but it 
is robustly significant for scale and insignificant for quality. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
One of the contributions of our study is to bring to light the previously underplayed construct of 
decision-making style as a key factor influencing innovative output and to demonstrate that as 
firms evolve in size, they experience changes in their decision-making style that affect the scale 
and quality of innovative output. In line with our arguments, we find a marked causal relation 
between firm size as measured by the number of employees and decision-making style. As firms 
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increase in size, they tend to rely more extensively on analytical decision tools to aid their 
decision making during the R&D process. 
A key contribution of our study is to show how firms’ decision-making style affects 
organizational-level outcomes. After controlling for industry and time effects, we demonstrate 
that different decision-making styles are adequate for different purposes. A highly analytical 
approach to R&D decisions hinders the introduction of numerous new products, presumably 
because it is time-consuming, requires substantial fixed costs for every research project, and 
restrains creativity by increasing the perception of risks. In turn, it leads to a reduced output of 
higher quality. A low-analytical approach is fast, consumes few resources, and does not filter out 
highly risky projects, which leads to an increased quantity of innovative output at the expense of 
its quality. The divergent effects of decision-making styles reported in this study question the 
long-standing view held by strategists who picture the task of intelligent management as 
necessarily facilitating analytically rational action (Levinthal and March, 1993) while outlining 
the conditions under which nonanalytical approaches may be desirable.  
Our results shed light on the size-R&D productivity dilemma by showing that firm size 
can be positively or negatively related to R&D productivity depending on the dimension we 
assess. Smaller firms are better than large firms at developing more new products per unit of 
R&D investment, but this advantage is eclipsed by the lower quality of their innovative output. 
This trade-off puts forth the more-difficult question whether scale is preferable to quality and 
under what circumstances. Although we may be tempted to conclude that the quality of the 
innovative output should always matter the most, current trends such as globalization, reduced 
product-cycle times, increasing competition, and technology fusion call for a higher speed of 
introduction of new products and for an ability to generate many subsequent products at a fast 
pace, and in such situations quality could play a secondary role. 
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Throughout the development of the mediation model we have conceptualized size as a 
dynamic variable that reflects changes in organizational structure, but more importantly, changes 
in firms’ cognition. As organizations increase in size, they change the cognitive lenses through 
which they view strategic decisions, and this change is accomplished through the acquisition of 
specific decision-aiding tools and procedures that make the R&D process increasingly analytical.  
 
Implications 
The fact that firms’ decision-making behaviors change with size, helps explain why size affects 
innovation. Because firm size per se is not solely accountable for variations in R&D productivity, 
further research may be needed to revisit the theoretical relevance of firm size and to better 
clarify how it affects organizational outcomes. Firm size is not a variable that managers are able 
to freely change in the short term. At most, managers in small firms can target a determined 
growth in size per year, and in large firms they can create spin-offs, spin outs, and skunk works to 
downsize their R&D business units. In this way, the behavior of such business units may 
resemble that of small firms. Rather than focusing on size, managers should try to influence the 
way R&D decisions are approached, as it is a decisive factor affecting innovation. 
The importance of decision-making styles in the R&D process points to the strategic 
relevance of key decision makers in charge of managing and shaping the decision-making 
processes in manufacturing firms. Our results suggest that managers must emphasize analytical 
decision making when improvements in the quality of the innovative output are needed but 
should emphasize a rather low-analytical approach when a quick succession of multiple new 
products is needed. Relatedly, because the quality of innovations is often hard to measure, 
managers may try to impose a target number of innovations in their strategic plans, but they 
should be aware of the potential problems of posing innovation targets. According to our results, 
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large firms using a highly analytical approach to R&D may not be able to produce a large number 
of high-quality innovations. Therefore, in such cases, imposing a given number of innovations as 
a target may be ineffective. This implies that firms should make a choice of the dimension of 
R&D productivity they want to pursue, because quality and quantity appear to be mutually 
exclusive dimensions. Moreover, heavy investments in state-of-the-art analytical tools to aid 
strategic decision-making processes may not always be desirable. This type of investment may be 
adequate for firms in a determined market position and in a specific stage of their life cycle in 
which improvements in profit margins of current products is more important than the 
development of additional new products. 
The prevalent assumption that analytical decisions yield choices superior to those coming 
from informal, low-analytical processes is questionable. Although this assumption may hold true 
in determined circumstances, it has led research to underplay the relevance of other sources of 
knowledge, such as intuition, out-of-the-box creativity, or even “gut feelings,” which have 
proven to be relevant for performance (Damasio, 1994). In contrast, consistent with evolutionary 
arguments depicting organizations as evolving and bounded-rational units that seek adaptation 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), we suggest that the process of innovation should not be conceived 
necessarily as a rational-analytical production process, but rather a process encompassing both 
analytical and nonanalytical factors. 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
Some limitations of this study include the measurement of the dependent variables. Although 
there are no perfect measurements for the scale and quality of innovations, other measures, such 
as patent counts or citation-based patent counts, could be used to re-examine our hypotheses and 
test the validity of our findings. Another limitation is that the variable used to capture decision-
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making style may not fully represent the essence of the construct. The construct of decision-
making style could be better captured through psychometric techniques applied to top 
management teams. Other improvements involve drawing on insights from behavioral decision-
making research to assess more accurately the type of cognitive characteristics that distinguish 
managers in successfully innovative firms. 
Although this study helps to address several issues regarding innovation-related decision 
making, it raises several others. A natural question arising from this study is whether the absence 
of analytical judgment implies higher reliance on intuitive judgment or whether these two 
thinking modes are independent in organizational decision making. If intuition is believed to play 
an important role in strategic decisions, how could intuition be measured at the organizational 
level? This greater question opens up an avenue for future research on organizational decision 
making. It is also important to order the time sequence of the two types of decision making. Agor 
(1989) argues that managers often rely on intuition after engaging in analytical thinking, to 
synthesize and integrate the judgments derived from the analysis. Conversely, Shapiro and 
Spence (1997) suggest that nonanalytical judgments should occur first, and thorough analytical 
judgments should follow to corroborate firsthand impressions or intuitions. 
In this study we have focused on key internal factors of innovation and have not 
considered how external factors could interact with the size or decision-making style of firms in 
determining innovative output. One variable of interest included as a control in this study, 
environmental uncertainty, has proved to affect innovative output, but we do not know whether 
larger or analytically-oriented firms are better suited for innovation purposes in highly volatile 
environments. Extending this study to include the moderating effect of external determinants of 
innovation offers an interesting line of future research. 
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Conclusions 
This study demonstrates that organizational decision-making style matters: It proves to be an 
important factor for understanding R&D productivity. We have stressed throughout that the way 
organizations approach decision making during the R&D process is dependent on firm size and 
that the choice of decision-making style ultimately affects the scale and quality of the innovative 
output. Highly analytical decision making leads firms to emphasize the quality of innovation, 
whereas low-analytical decision making leads to emphasizing the quantity of innovations. In 
making this point, we tried to fit this study into the literature linking firm size with innovation, 
and have expanded the debate by including the mediating role of decision-making style and by 
distinguishing two dimensions of R&D productivity. To wrap up, we suggest that further research 
on how decision-making styles affect the strategic behavior of firms is needed not only for theory 
development, but also to increase organizational scholars’ attention to other sources of 
knowledge, apart from analytical procedures, that can help organizations form judgments in 
complex situations. We hope this study helps reduce the gap between organization research and 
decision-making research and call for further efforts to bridge these complementary areas. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
I will do it better than you because I have done it before: 
How experience breeds illusion of control 
 
Introduction 
People tend to believe they exert control over outcomes that are outside their span of control 
(Langer, 1975). One way in which this illusion is manifested is by people’s tendency to prefer 
being ‘in charge’ themselves as opposed to others, even in situations governed by chance. This 
pervasive illusion of control is particularly relevant in processes that are highly influenced by 
complex and unknown phenomena in which individuals exert little or no control. For example, 
the performance of a security in the stock market, the outcome of complex strategic management 
decisions, the result of radical innovation activities. To illustrate the relevance of this illusion, 
consider a manager responsible for a firm’s financial investments, would she invest the firm’s 
funds herself or would she delegate the task to a fund manager? Would the amount invested 
differ depending on who is in charge of the operation? Moreover, would her decision depend on 
her experience in financial investments? Research suggests that feelings of control lead 
individuals to exaggerate their subjective probability of success, which in turn lead them to prefer 
to be in control, even in purely random tasks (Langer, 1975; Koehler, Gibbs, and Hogarth, 1994). 
In a number of studies, Langer (1975) showed that people prefer to choose their own lottery 
ticket instead of having one chosen for them. Similarly, Fellner, Güth and Maciejovsky (2004) 
report a tendency for people to prefer their individually chosen portfolio in favor of an equally 
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good alternative chosen by another person. This general finding is robust over different 
dependent measures, including willingness to bet, willingness to trade an item, reports of 
confidence over outcomes, among others (e.g., Burger & Cooper, 1979; McKenna, 1993; 
Wortman, 1975). 
Yet, there are domains in which people consistently underestimate their performance 
relative to others’ (Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003) 
suggesting that they may not always prefer to be in charge of uncertain tasks. In a study by 
Benartzi and Thaler (2002), in which participants were faced with the task of investing in pension 
funds resulting from a self-selected portfolio, an average portfolio, and a professional portfolio, 
the majority of participants preferred the average and professional portfolios to the self-selected 
one. 
An underexplored but potentially critical factor influencing people’s assessments of their 
influence over outcomes is their experience. Referring to the previous example, it is reasonable to 
expect that experience in financial investing will lead the manager to prefer being in charge of the 
process, while the lack of experience may lead her to delegate the task. Recent studies have 
documented the impact of experience on decisions. Findings suggest that when participants learn 
about risky prospects from experience their choices are dramatically different than when they 
learn about these prospects from convenient descriptions (Hertwig, Erev, Barron & Weber, 2004; 
Weber, Shafir & Blais, 2004). Because the conditions that facilitate illusory control vary 
depending on the context and particularly on the contexts of information acquisition, we propose 
that illusion of control is affected by the source of information (experience vs. description) 
influencing risk-taking behavior. This study focuses on the interaction between experience-based 
learning and the illusion of control, two phenomena that often cause people to have a naïve 
perception of the world they live in. 
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We experimentally assess the influence of source of information on the willingness to bet 
on a random event and its interaction with person in charge (self or other). We consider two 
scenarios: a scenario where people learn about a lottery from description, that is, observing the 
possible outcomes and likelihoods of those outcomes; and a scenario where people learn about a 
lottery from experience, that is, by sampling from an urn with replacement. These scenarios are 
replicated both in a situation where the participant is in charge executing the lottery, and in a 
situation where someone else is in charge of executing the lottery.  
 
Theory and hypotheses 
 
Several scenarios have been identified where illusion of control is expected (Langer, 
1975), where it is not expected (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and where it may be reversed 
(Thompson, 1999; Martin, Abramson & Alloy, 1984). Illusion of control is expected in situations 
characterized by personal involvement, familiarity, foreknowledge of the desired outcome, and 
success at the task (Langer, 1975; Thompson, 1999), among people with nondepressed mood 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979) and in need for control (Biner, Angle, Park, Mellinger, & Barber, 
1995). When there is feedback highlighting failure and negative moods, the illusion of control is 
not expected (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). By contrast, Martin et al. (1984) found that depressed 
participants tended to overestimate someone else’s control over a non-contingent outcome, and 
also that females judged others to have a high degree of control over a random task, thus 
suggesting a reversed illusion of control. Although a large body of research has been conducted 
on illusion of control, little is known about how this bias interacts with experience. We delineate 
three competing hypotheses. The first, a default hypothesis, is that people believe they exert no 
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control over a purely random process. Although there is evidence of illusion of control taking 
place in several contexts, we propose this hypothesis because the interaction of illusion of control 
and experience has not been explored before. 
A second hypothesis is related to the finding that involvement with a task facilitates 
illusions of control. According to Langer (1975) people engage in illusions of control because 
they confuse luck for skill. This confusion is likely to happen when chance situations have 
characteristics of skill-based situations. For example, familiarity and involvement are 
characteristics that may favor ones chances in a skill task but will grant no advantage in a purely 
random task. Thus, illusion of control is observed when people have the chance to practice the 
task, increasing the degree of involvement with such task (Matute, 1996; Thompson et al., 1998) 
and when participants have more time to think about the task (Langer, 1975), among several 
other situations. Because the conditions that facilitate the illusion of control vary depending on 
the context and particularly on the contexts of information acquisition, this hypothesis proposes 
that illusion of control will be observed both in the experience and description condition, but will 
be higher in the experience condition. More precisely, we suggest that people will confuse chance 
with skill leading to a higher willingness to pay to play the lottery when they are in charge of 
executing the lottery, but the illusory control of subjects acquiring information through 
experience will be higher than for subjects acquiring descriptive information. 
A third hypothesis is based on the assertion that people tend to judge themselves better 
than average on easy tasks and worse than average on difficult tasks (Kruger & Burrus, 2004; 
Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 2008). Findings suggest that people have more 
information about themselves than about others, so when their own performance is exceptional 
(either good or bad), they assume that others’ will be less exceptional. Therefore, they believe 
that they are above average on tasks in which they have performed well and below average on 
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tasks in which they have performed poorly. Additional support for this hypothesis is the finding 
that the above-average effect tends to occur in domains in which absolute skills are high but a 
below-average effect tends to occur in domains in which absolute skills are low (Kruger, 1999). 
We propose that learning from experience increases involvement with the task and this highlights 
the misperception that skills influence outcomes, making the task appear easier than what it 
actually is. By contrast, learning about a random task from description highlights its random 
nature, which in turn emphasizes the irrelevance of skills, making the task appear difficult. This 
third hypothesis, therefore, predicts that people will prefer to be in charge of the task when they 
learn about it from experience, and prefer somebody else to be in charge of the task when they 
learn about it from description. More precisely, source of information and person in charge 
interact in such way that when people learn from experience they are willing to pay more to play 
the lottery if they are in charge of execution, but when they learn from description they are 
willing to pay more if someone else is in charge of lottery execution. 
We report two studies that investigated how source of information interacts with person in 
charge. In the two studies, illusion of control was assessed by asking participants to report their 
willingness to pay to play a lottery following the traditional Becker, de Groot and Marschak 
(1964) which has been shown to elicit incentive compatible responses. This willingness to pay 
was contrasted for the cases when the participants were in charge of activating a random task to 
the cases when the experimenter was in charge to activating it. 
 
Study 1 
 
Methods 
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The experiment is a 2x2 between-subject design. Participants are assigned to one of four 
conditions that differ in whether they learn about a lottery from description or experience and 
whether the lottery is played by themselves or by the experimenter (self-draw or experimenter-
draw). Participants performed two tasks: a simple choice problem designed to earn game money 
and an inference task in which participants state their willingness to pay (WTP) to play a lottery. 
We use WTP to capture the differences in magnitude of individuals’ commitment to a risky task 
depending on the source of information and person in charge of executing the task. 
 
Participants 
Eighty-six volunteers served as paid participants in this study. The sample was largely 
male (61%), and the proportion of male to female participants was evenly distributed among the 
four conditions. Participants were undergraduate students from various backgrounds at 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain. 
 
 Apparatus and procedure 
The experiment was run in a computerized laboratory in eight successive sessions with a 
median of eleven participants in each session. Participants entered the laboratory and sat in front 
of a computer screen for the first task, which did not vary across conditions. The first task 
involved a one-shot choice between 10€ for sure and 12€ with 30% probability or 0€ otherwise. 
The objective of this task is two-fold. On the one hand, by having participants earn their game 
money, we reduce the influence of a house-money effect on risk-taking behavior. On the other 
hand, by setting a riskless option of 10€ objectively –and exaggeratedly—more favorable than a 
risky option of 12€, we expect to have most participants move to the second task with constant 
earnings and therefore constant reference points which facilitates the analysis. 
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The second task involved expressing the WTP to play a lottery that pays 10€ with 
probability 0.9 and 0€ otherwise. This task differs from previous tasks used in studies of illusion 
of control because it involves high probability of winning, whereas most tasks used in other 
studies involved small probability of winning. In previous studies, control is revealed by people 
overestimating their probability of winning, while in the current task, control would be revealed 
by an underestimation of the probability of not gaining 10€. The reason to make the positive gain 
so probable is that emphasis on success has shown to increase the illusions of control (Langer and 
Roth, 1975). 
The procedure to elicit the WTP followed the traditional Becker, de Groot and Marschak 
(1964) method for incentive compatibility. In this method, participants are asked to express their 
maximum WTP for a risky lottery. Their WTP is then compared to the price of the lottery, which 
is a random number between the highest and lowest outcomes of the risky lottery. If the stated 
WTP is higher than or equal to the randomly drawn price, the participant pays the price and plays 
the lottery. Otherwise the participant pays nothing and does not play the lottery.  
After the first task, the experimenter calls the attention of all participants and shows them 
ten lottery tickets priced from 1€2 to 10€. The experimenter then shuffles the tickets and asks for 
a volunteer to select one ticket at random and sign its back without looking at its price. All 
participants become aware that one ticket was drawn at random but none knows its price. 
The second task of the experiment is done individually in the experimenter’s office, which 
is located inside the laboratory but in a separate room. For each participant in the four conditions, 
the experimenter reads aloud the following instructions: 
                                                 
2
 Though the lottery’s lowest payoff was 0€, we used 1€ as the lowest ticket price to avoid confusion with the 
possible zero-cost of the lottery. This change does not alter the incentive compatibility in the Becker-deGroot-
Marschak method. 
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“You have won 10€ (0€ or 12€) in the first part of the experiment. This money 
is yours. Now, the experiment consists of the following game, the bag that you 
see on the table has tokens inside, these can be red or black. The game consists 
of withdrawing one token from the bag without looking. If the token withdrawn 
is red, the university will pay you 10€, while if the token is black the university 
will pay you nothing. To play this lottery it is necessary to purchase a ticket, but 
you do not know the price of the ticket. In fact, you saw the price drawn at 
random by a volunteer in the first part of the experiment. Your task is to offer 
the amount that you would be willing to pay to purchase a ticket to play the 
lottery. If your offer is higher than or equal to its price, you will pay the price 
and play the lottery. Otherwise, you will not be able to play the lottery. Before 
expressing your willingness to pay …” 
 
In the rest of the experiment, instructions differed across conditions. In the description 
condition, the instructions followed: 
“… I will show you the content of the bag.” The experimenter empties the 
content of the bag on top of the table and reveals 9 red tokens and 1 black.  
In the experience condition, the instructions followed: 
“… I will let you play the game as many times as you like, but without 
monetary remuneration. The goal is that you learn about the content of the bag 
such that you can estimate the amount that you are willing to pay to play the 
game for real money. You can withdraw as many tokens as you like, one by 
one, always letting the experimenter put the token back in the bag before you 
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draw again. You must tell the experimenter when you have sampled enough”. 
The participants then sampled the lottery as much as they wanted. 
 
After the participants had seen the content of the bag (description) and sampled the lottery 
sufficiently (experience), they answered in a written form, one of the two following questions 
provided also in a written form: 
Self-draw (DS condition): “¿How much are you willing to pay for a ticket to 
play this game, taking into account that you will draw the token out of the bag?” 
Experimenter-draw (DE condition): “¿How much are you willing to pay for a 
ticket to play this game, taking into account that the experimenter will draw the 
token out of the bag?” 
 
The materials used in the experiment were casino tokens and a dark brown bag that did 
not allow participants to see the tokens inside. Lottery tickets were designed in essay to resemble 
real lottery tickets. A laboratory assistant recorded all experimental results. 
 
Compensation 
Participants did not receive a show-up fee but were paid for the payoffs in the first and 
second task. When the participant’s WTP in the second task was lower than the random price of 
the lottery, the compensation was equal to the payoff in the first task. Otherwise, the 
compensation was the payoff of the first task minus the random price plus the payoff of the 
lottery. The mean compensation was 12.10€. 
 
Results 
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As expected, 83 participants chose the safe 10€-option in the first task, while three 
participants chose the risky lottery and obtained 0€. These participants were removed from the 
analysis as their WTP was elicited from a different reference point than the majority of 
participants. The final sample consisted of 83 participants: 20 participants in the DE condition, 20 
in DS, 22 in EE, and 21 in ES. 
ANOVA results show a significant interaction between source of knowledge and person 
in charge, F(1, 83) = 66.04, p = .002. The analysis showed no significant main effect for person 
in charge, F(1, 83) = 14.73, p = .138, or for the source of knowledge, F(1, 83) = 15.04, p = .134. 
Figure 1 shows that in the description condition, participants were, on average, willing to pay a 
significantly higher amount to play the lottery when the token was drawn by the experimenter 
(7.95€; SD = 2.76) than when it was drawn by themselves (5.55€; SD = 2.84). The opposite is 
observed in the experience condition, where participants were willing to pay a mean of 6.76€ (SD 
= 2.98) when the token was drawn by themselves and a mean of 5.59€ (SD = 1.44) when the 
token was drawn by the experimenter. 
Results from Study 1 disconfirm the first and second hypothesis and favor the third 
hypothesis. Participants that learned about the lottery from experience became involved with the 
task, and results suggest that participants perceived the task easier for them than for the 
experimenter. Moreover, participants in the experience condition revealed illusion of control 
across different observed probability. When participants in the experience condition were 
separated into those that observed the black token more often than expected and those that 
observed the black token less often than expected, results are similar. This finding, shown in 
figure 2 suggests that the driver of the effect is not the observed probability but the source of 
information.  
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Figure 1: Study 1:  WTP for a lottery that pays 10€ with p=0.90 and 0€ otherwise. 
 
Note: Error bars indicate standard deviation. 
Figure 2. Study 1: WTP for a lottery in samples of different observed probabilities 
 
Note: Error bars indicate standard deviation. 
Is this pattern of results driven by the attractiveness of the lottery? An alternative 
explanation of current results is that this highly attractive lottery breeds illusion of control in 
experience because the black token is underweighted (Hertwig et al, 2004), and favors the reverse 
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effect in description because the black token is overweighted. Relating this assumption to the 
general observation that people tend to attribute causality to personal factors for good outcomes 
and to others for bad outcomes (Miller & Ross, 1975), then participants in the experience 
condition would prefer to be in charge of playing the lottery to benefit from the likely gain, 
whereas participants in the description condition would prefer the experimenter to be in charge as 
the bad outcome is overweighted. To rule out this alternative hypothesis we designed study 2, 
which follows the same method and procedure as study 1 and involves a less attractive lottery, 
one in which failure is more frequent than success. 
 
Study 2 
 
This study was aimed at testing whether the attractiveness of the lottery used in Study 1 
drove the pattern of results. Therefore, Study 2 was a replication of Study 1 with identical 
method, materials and procedure, excepting for one major variation. The lottery used involved a 
10% chance to win 10€ and 0€ otherwise. Therefore, this time, the bag contained 9 black tokens 
that paid 0€ and one red token that paid 10€. 
 
Participants 
Eighty-six volunteers served as paid participants. There were 21 participants in the DE 
condition, 23 in DS, 21 in EE, and 1 in ES. The sample was 52% female, and the proportion of 
male to female participants was evenly distributed among the four conditions. Participants were 
undergraduate students from various backgrounds at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain. 
 
Compensation 
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As in study 1, participants did not receive a show-up fee but were paid for the payoffs in 
the first and second task. The mean compensation was 9.80 €. 
 
Results 
 
Results suggest that the attractiveness of the lottery does not drive the interaction between 
source of knowledge and person in charge. ANOVA results confirm the pattern observed in 
Study 1. The interaction between source of information and person in charge is significant, F(1, 
86)= 11.47, p=.054. The main effects for illusion of control (as reflected by person in charge) and 
information source are not significant. Figure 3 displays the same pattern as Figure 1 although the 
amounts participants are willing to pay are notably smaller as a consequence of the less attractive 
lottery. In the description condition, participants were, on average, willing to pay a higher amount 
to play the lottery when the token was drawn by the experimenter (2€; SD = 2.10) than when it 
was drawn by themselves (1.30€; SD = 1.46). The opposite is observed in the experience 
condition, where participants were willing to pay a mean of 2.43€ (SD = 1.78) when the token 
was drawn by themselves and a mean of 1.67€ (SD = 2.11) when the token was drawn by the 
experimenter. 
 
Small samples in the experience condition 
One commonly observed finding in the literature of experience-based choice is that 
people draw small samples, even when sampling is costless. For example, Hertwig et al (2004) 
found, for a binary choice task, a sample median of 15 observations per problem (7 per lottery). 
Weber et al. (2004) found similar results.  In our study 1, the mean sample size was 5.16 draws 
(SD = 1.82) and the median was 5, while in study 2 the mean sample size was 7.21 (SD = 2.59) 
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Figure 3. Study 2: WTP for a lottery that pays 10€ with p=0.10 and 0€ otherwise. 
 
Note: Error bars indicate standard deviation. 
 
and the median 7. It is important to highlight that the task in studies 1 and 2 is not a choice task, 
where small samples may amplify the differences and render choice simpler (Hertwig & Pleskac, 
2008). In the current context, small samples are objectively misleading. The relevance of this 
result is emphasized as participants sampled from only one lottery, and not from many lotteries as 
in previous studies (e.g. more than 12 lotteries in Hertwig et al’s analysis of 6 problems). 
The significant difference between sample sizes in study 1 and 2 (t = 4.37, p < .001, N = 
42) reflects the different search patterns of participants as a function of the attractiveness of the 
lottery. In the attractive lottery, participants drew smaller samples possibly because they 
encountered the desired outcome more frequently, whereas in the unattractive lottery participants 
persisted in their search for a desired outcome. 
One important aspect of the current sampling design is that it resembles a realistic 
sampling process. In this case, sampling was not as costless as in previous studies where draws 
were done by clicking on a button in a computer screen (e.g. Hertwig et al., 2004; Hau et al., 
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2008; Rakow et al., 2008). The process of sampling in this study involved participants putting 
their hand in a bag and pulling out a token. The experimenter would then get the token back from 
the participant, put it back in the bag and shake the bag to shuffle the tokens, to start the process 
again. Therefore, the process of sampling may have appeared more costly than in previous 
studies, which could have limited sample size. Yet, it should be born in mind that, if sampling 
tends to be more costly outside the laboratory than in an experimental setting, we suspect that 
sample sizes of real-world phenomena would then be trivial. 
 
Insensitivity to observed probabilities 
 
Additional evidence for the interaction between experience and illusion of control can be 
found in the analysis of different observed probabilities. Results from studies 1 and 2 reveal 
participants’ insensitivity to observed probabilities.  Figures 3 and 4 break down the experience 
condition between participants that observed the rare token (the black token in study 1 and the 
red token in study 2) more frequently than expected by its objective probability and participants 
that observed the rare token less frequently than expected. In Study 1, 23 of the 43 participants in 
the experience condition never encountered the black token that paid 0€ (hereafter, the 
experience-no-black condition) while 20 participants encountered it at least once. Since all 
participants that encountered the black token (hereafter experience-black condition) sampled less 
than 10 times, the chance of getting the black token was overrepresented in their samples. The 
mean observed probability of participants in the experience-black condition was 0.24 (N = 20, 
SD = 0.10) and 0 of those in the experience-no-black. Yet, WTP to play the lottery was strikingly 
similar between these two groups (see Figure 2). Although the overall WTP did not change 
significantly, higher perceived risk led to a more marked illusion of control, as reflected by a 
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higher WTP difference between those in charge of executing the lottery and those that were not 
in charge. Notably, as the risk of getting the black token increased, participants were more 
willing to draw the token themselves. 
Insensitivity to probabilities can also be seen by comparing the results produced by the 
participants in the description condition, who saw a 0.10 probability of 0€, and the results 
produced by the participants in the experience-no-black condition, who saw a 0 probability of 0€. 
The pooled WTP for the description condition is a mean of 6.75€ (N = 40, SD = 3.01) and the 
pooled WTP for the experience-no-black condition is 6.35€ (N = 2.65, SD = 2.14). Identical 
results can be observed in Study 2. The pooled WTP for the description condition is a mean of 
1.57€ (N = 42, SD = 1.77) and the pooled WTP for the participants in the experience condition 
that never encounter the red token (experience-no-red) is 2.08€ (N =41, SD = 1.98). 
 
Fig. 4. Study 2: WTP for a lottery in samples of different observed probabilities 
 
Note: Error bars indicate standard deviation. 
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General discussion 
This research examined how people’s illusion of control interacts with experience. Two 
studies reported herein found that participants that learned about a lottery from experience were 
willing to pay higher amounts to play the lottery when they activated the random event than when 
the experimenter did. Conversely, the two studies revealed that participants that learned about the 
lottery from a convenient description paid higher amounts to play the lottery when the 
experimenter activates the random event than when they activate it themselves. Interestingly, this 
pattern of results was robust to the attractiveness of the lottery as well as to marked differences in 
perceived risk. 
The seminal work by Langer (1975) introduced the idea of an illusion of control that 
predicts that people prefer to be in charge of tasks that produce random outcomes. Results from 
our study suggest a reverse illusion of control in scenarios where the random nature of the task is 
described rather than experienced. It is important to bear in mind that a reverse illusion of control 
still considers that a certain degree of control can be exerted over random outcomes, thus 
implying a cognitive bias. The difference, however, is that the carrier of control is not oneself but 
other. This idea has been developed in the context of learned helplessness (Alloy & Abrahamson, 
1982), which suggests that in certain contexts, people perceive lack of control over outcomes. 
This condition has been associated to clinical depression (Selingman, 1975). In fact, previous 
studies on depressed participants had already provided evidence of a reverse illusion of control 
(Martin et al, 1984).  In this study, we provide an alternative explanation based on a social factor 
interacting with the source of information: people perceive themselves worse than average on 
tasks perceived as difficult, and a key factor explaining varying perceptions of task difficulty is 
the source of information.  
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There are many consequential economic and social situations with the key characteristics 
of our experiments. Both studies 1 and 2 serve as metaphors for a situation in which a manager is 
responsible for investing its firm’s funds on the stock market. We learned that experience will 
influence the decision on whether to delegate the task. A fund manager with experience will 
avoid delegating the task even though she is aware that outcomes depend on random fluctuations 
of the market (Makridakis et al, 2008). If she is forced to delegate the task, for external reasons, 
she will invest less than what she would invest if she was in charge. 
Another example is the decision of who should drive a car in a selected route that, as most 
car journeys, involves a small risk of an accident. A person may prefer to drive the car on a route 
that she has done repeatedly, whereas the same driver may prefer somebody else to drive in a 
new route that has to be assessed from a descriptive map.  
Our findings add evidence to the notion that the way people learn about a probabilistic 
event affects the risk they are willing to take (Hertwig et al, 2004: Weber et al, 2004). In addition, 
our findings suggest that the risk people are willing to take depend, to a significant extent to the 
interaction between the source of knowledge and the person to in charge of executing the task. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Learning from past strategic decisions: 
Hindsight bias as a source of superstitious learning 
 
Introduction 
Large-scale strategic decisions are rare, complex, made in ambiguous environments, and 
governed by causal and outcome ambiguity (Zollo, 2009). Examples of such decisions are major 
acquisitions and mergers, major organizational change programs, important repositioning of 
products, or any other significant strategic decision occurring a few times in the life-span of an 
organization. Organization scholars agree that in such situations rational analysis and deduction 
are likely to be difficult to apply (March, 2006), and instead, knowledge gained from prior 
decisions is likely to be retrieved as a source of valuable information (March, Sproull and Tamuz, 
1991; Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin, 2005). This idea has caused an interest in how feedback 
from the performance of previous decisions affects the likelihood of different types of strategic 
actions (March, 1991; Greve, 1998). 
While the belief that strategic decisions are well-served by experiential learning is 
strongly rooted among managers and management scholars, research in behavioral disciplines 
suggest that learning from experience comes at the cost of numerous biases which may outweigh 
the benefits of the competences developed through the accumulation of experience (Bukszar and 
Connolly, 1988; March, 2006). Surprisingly, despite the relevance of learning processes in 
strategic decision making, little is known about the mechanisms that lead to such imperfections. 
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A major problem in learning from past strategic decisions has to do with the possibility of 
“superstitious learning”, which is the gap between managers’ beliefs about the causes of strategic 
outcomes and the actual causes (Levitt and March, 1988; Zollo, 2009). A leading explanation for 
why superstitious learning occurs, points at overconfidence effects spurred by experience 
accumulation, which are often strong enough to overtake the competence building process 
generated by the stock of experience (Zollo, 2009).  
In this paper we propose another mechanism to help explain superstitious learning, 
namely, the hindsight bias. Studies by cognitive psychologists show that when individuals 
retrieve information from the past, they incur hindsight bias, which refers to the tendency for 
people to see an event as more likely after the event has occurred than prior to the event 
(Fischhoff, 1975). In hindsight, people tend to exaggerate their predictive capacity of events 
which have already taken place (Hoffrage and Pohl, 2003; Musch and Wagner, 2007). The main 
argument is that judgments made in hindsight about the probability of success of previous 
decisions are likely to be strongly biased towards actual outcomes, and this leads to biased 
codification of the cause-effect relation linking past strategic decisions and realized outcomes. 
Moreover, we elaborate on the heuristic mechanisms that may be responsible for such bias. 
We use a grounded theory approach to explore how managers use the information from 
previous experiences in strategic decisions to formulate new decisions. Through ten in-depth 
interviews to top-managers in the health industry we gather information to build theoretical 
propositions. Because experiential learning has been studied in decisions made with high 
frequency (e.g. learning curves literature), the contribution of this article is to further understand 
experiential learning in the context of rare strategic decisions. By shedding light on the micro-
processes followed by decision makers when learning from experience, we identify some of the 
limitations of managerial cognition in strategic decision making. 
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We begin by exploring experiential learning and its relevance in strategy formulation. 
Then, we elaborate on superstitious learning. Following, we briefly review the literature o 
hindsight bias, and provide propositions on how it affects strategic decisions and how it can help 
explain superstitious learning. Throughout the development of propositions we provide insights 
from interviews to top managers. We conclude with a discussion and concluding remarks.   
 
Theoretical Background 
The Role of Experiential Learning in Strategic Decision Making 
The growing importance of experiential learning in decision making is evidenced by its central 
position in organizational decision theory (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1994; Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Greve, 2003; Gavetti, Levinthal and Rivkin, 2005; March, 2006), and by the 
burgeoning interest in cognitive psychology (Hertwig, Fanselow, and Hoffrage, 2003; Hertwig et 
al., 2004; Erev and Barron, 2005). In organization research, ideas of experience-based processes 
have been used to understand action, change, and the development of knowledge in organizations 
(March, 1994). In this literature, the use of past experiences as a source of knowledge is usually 
proposed as an alternative to analytical decision processes, since strategic rationality appears to 
demand greater stability in preferences and higher cognitive capabilities compared to what can be 
sustained in reality (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
Approaches to decision making stressing the importance of deductive reasoning and 
analytical choice in the strategy-making process, have been criticized for their inadequacy in 
complex scenarios of highly interactive variables where deductive rationality is least able to 
provide effective decisions (Simon, 1955; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 2006). As a 
reaction to models of calculative rationality, theories stemming from behavioral disciplines have 
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emerged to provide alternative explanations about how decision makers approach strategic 
decisions. Many studies in this field point to the importance of experiential learning as the key 
element aiding strategic choice (Cohen and Sproull, 1996; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Greve, 
2003). The underlying idea is that organizations learn from feedback-based reinforcement 
processes and thus increase organizational intelligence (Levitt and March, 1988; Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Denrell and March, 2001; March, 2006). Reinforcement processes are those in 
which the propensity to adopt certain procedures depends on the feedback from past outcomes 
and where more successful procedures are more likely to survive than less successful ones 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Greve, 2003). The proponents of this view believe that such processes 
are beneficial because they allow firms to discover effective competitive positions in novel 
environments (Gavetti et al., 2005).  
Nonetheless, organizations often depend on simplified interpretations of past events and 
on judgmental heuristics, which reflect the systematic limitations of decision makers’ cognitive 
and memory capabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Learning processes are less reliable in 
situations when feedback is limited and difficult to interpret — as it is frequently the case in 
strategic decision situations — and therefore, such task environments exacerbate the 
identification of links between decisions and observed outcomes (Denrell, Fang and Levinthal, 
2004). Yet, it is precisely in those decision situations where information about the environment is 
most ambiguous that top managers have to rely on interpretations of past events. 
 
Superstitious learning from strategic decisions 
In addition to the fact that strategic decisions are infrequent, task dissimilarity between strategic 
decisions, noise, ambiguity, temporal delays, and environmental changes, further decrease the 
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usefulness of feedback (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; March, 2006). In these settings people 
become remarkably insensitive to determining whether outcomes should be attributed to their 
skill or to other uncontrollable factors (Hogarth, 1987; Friedland, 2006), which in turn promotes 
superstitious learning. According to Levitt and March’s (1988) seminal paper, superstitious 
learning is defined as a situation in which “the subjective experience of learning is compelling, 
but the connections between actions and outcomes are misspecified”. For example, when 
managers observe that their decision to introduce a radical new technology is followed by utmost 
success, they tend to overlook the infinity of factors that brought about such success and attribute 
it to few factors such as managerial foresight, effective predictions about the state of the 
environment, reliable information regarding consumer behavior, among others. In fact, only a 
low percentage of radical innovations turn out to be great successes, and even within the same 
firm, strategic decisions based on the predictions from the same management team and same 
reliable information sources may produce disturbingly different outcomes. The consequences of 
superstitious learning is the overestimation of managers’ influence over uncertain processes and 
misleading understanding of the underlying causes of success. We sustain that a central 
mechanism explaining superstitious learning is ‘hindsight bias’ which we review in the next 
section. 
 
Judgments made in hindsight 
The accuracy of judgments based on information from past experiences also depends on the way 
decision makers construct their memory. Cognitive psychologists claim that our memory of the 
past is not a memory of the uncertainties of the past, but rather a reconstruction of past events 
based on the outcomes we have observed. The knowledge that an event has occurred seems to 
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reshape memory (Hogarth, 1987), and with hindsight, we tend to exaggerate what we had known 
in foresight (Hoffrage and Pohl, 2003).  
This effect, called the “hindsight bias”, is the inclination to see past events as being 
predictable and reasonable to expect. Several experiments are found in the literature in which 
people are presented with outcome knowledge and, as a consequence, tend to falsely believe that 
they would have predicted the outcome of such event (Hoffrage and Pohl, 2003). This bias has 
been identified in a variety of experimental tasks (Fischhoff, 1982), including confidence 
judgments in the outcome of events, choices between alternatives, and estimations of quantities; 
as well as in a variety of domains outside the laboratory, such as political events (Pennington, 
1981), medical diagnosis (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, and Harkness, 1981), outcomes of scientific 
experiments (Slovic and Fischhoff, 1977), economic decisions (Bukszar and Connolly, 1988), 
and general knowledge (Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988). It is a robust 
phenomenon which is hard to eliminate and that can be easily demonstrated (Fischhoff, 1982; 
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 1991). Besides, this effect has proved more pronounced 
when people have little experience in a task or decision (Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 
1991; Musch and Wagner, 2007), which is particularly relevant for strategic decisions. 
In the context of strategic decisions, there is only one study looking at this effect, and it is 
tested in an experimental setting. In this experiment by Bukszar and Connolly (1988), three 
groups of advanced strategy students in an MBA program were given a strategy case regarding a 
pharmaceutical firm’s expansion to another country. The three groups were asked for an analysis 
of the potential success or failure of this strategic decision in terms of return on investment (ROI) 
after a two-year period, based on detailed information provided in the case. The three groups 
differed in the following way: the first group had no outcome information (control group); the 
second group had a report saying that the firm generated a ROI of 36 percent after the two year 
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period (high-outcome condition), and the third group had a report saying that the firm generated a 
ROI of 4 percent after the two year period (low-outcome condition). The groups which were 
provided outcome information were instructed to ignore it, and to base their predictions on the 
descriptive information. Results showed that the participants were unable to ignore outcome 
information in spite of being specifically warned to do so. The predicted ROI were significantly 
different between groups and were biased toward the outcome information they had observed, 
while the control group predicted a value in between the others. Moreover, students in the high-
outcome condition tended to see the strategic decision as less risky and more attractive than those 
in the low-outcome condition.  
Hindsight bias plays a key role in judgments of sequential events. Second judgments are 
less independent than what managers would like to believe, and this can have considerable 
consequences when the initial judgment is poor. Consider the example of a physician who is 
asked a second opinion on a diagnosis but is aware of the first diagnose, or a researcher who is 
asked to review a manuscript but knows the results of previous reviews (Pohl, 2004). Similarly, 
managers that have to decide whether to follow a given course of action may be biased to decide 
according to past knowledge of the outcome of similar decisions. 
Correspondingly, consider the example of a manager who retrieves a past decision and 
attempts to evaluate the quality of the decision process that was followed for such decision. It 
would be inadequate to take into consideration information that was not (and could not possibly 
be) available at the moment the decision was made, as happens with realized outcomes. In the 
presence of hindsight bias, a manager evaluating past decisions may conclude that decisions 
resulting in positive outcomes were caused by better decision processes than those that resulted in 
negative ones (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). 
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When managers are aware of the result of past strategic decisions, negative outcomes are 
confidently judged as caused by poor decisions (Clapham and Schwenk, 1991), although these 
decisions were probably judged as adequate at the time they were made.  The consequence of this 
distortion is the illusion of “creeping determinism” (Fischhoff, 1975), as if the environment was 
characterized by being predictable and where causal links between decisions and outcomes are 
evident and easily established. Therefore this distortion leads to judging past events as having 
been inevitable and to overestimating the likelihood of success of strategic decisions when top 
managers are aware that similar decisions have proved successful in the past. To shed some light 
on the possibility of hindsight bias as a cause of superstitious learning in strategic decision 
making, we set out to interview a group of managers to draw information on how they assess past 
strategic decisions. 
 
Semi-structured interviews to top managers 
The data for this research consists of semi-structured interviews with top-managers in several 
organizations in the health industry. All of them form public or private hospital, or clinics. A total 
of 10 interviewees participated in the study. Because we are interested in gathering information 
about strategic decision processes and experience, participant selection criteria were based on: (1) 
level of seniority, and (2) hierarchy within the company, because only top managers with enough 
experience in their firms’ strategy formulation are likely to convey valid information regarding 
these issues. The mean age of participants is 43.7, and their experience in the industry was on 
average 16 years. There were a total of 6 men and 4 women. The length of the interviews ranged 
from approximately 40 to 60 minutes. The interview questions were open-ended and intended to 
elicit participants’ views about their organization’s strategy making processes, strategy evaluation 
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and the use of experiential information. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed to 
enhance the reliability of the analysis. In total there were 67 pages of interview text. 
Because the nature of this study is exploratory, the data gathered in these interviews is not 
used for statistical testing but rather for building theoretical propositions. We begin by asking 
interviewees their general conception of strategy formulation and strategic decisions, to examine 
whether their vision of strategy coincides with its corresponding academic notion. Then, we 
moved on to ask questions about learning from past strategic decisions, evaluation of past 
strategy, handling information from past decisions, and experiential learning in general. 
 
Managerial perspectives on strategy and hindsight judgments 
Earlier studies (see March and Shapira, 1987, for a review) report a substantial gap between 
manager’s and academics’ understanding of managerial risk-taking and managerial action. 
Therefore, before asking specifically about the role of experience in strategic decision making, 
we asked each manager to define the term ‘strategic decision’ in order to start the interview with 
a shared understanding of the term and to explore the particular perspectives of participants. 
There was a consensus among all the participants by which they regarded strategic decisions as 
radically different from routine, operational decisions made every day. Among all the definitions, 
there was a common notion of strategic decisions as involving “uncertainty”, “risk”, “change”, as 
a “time consuming process”, made in “unclear scenarios”, and with a “tremendous impact on the 
organization”. Some managers recalled concepts related to the fuzziness involved in strategic 
decisions, such as “tricky”, “hazy”, or “inherently problematic” decisions. Lastly, another group 
recalled concepts relating to the way these decision processes are conducted, saying that strategic 
decisions are made “always by teams and never individually”, made by “directive committees”, 
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“over a long period of time, and in a sequential manner”. One of the most representative answers 
was the following:  
“I think of strategic decisions as those important decisions implying 
structural changes, reorganization, or repositioning of our whole 
organization. […] Of course they are rare and only take place once in a 
while, but when we have to deal with these situations we focus all our 
attention and resources on that particular decision process to make sure we 
eliminate all potential risks. We believe you can’t assume risks in strategic 
decisions. We bring our best people, consult experts, and meditate the final 
decision progressively, little by little.”  
 
In general, the notion of strategic decision was surprisingly similar to the notion 
developed in the academic literature. In this particular sample, the common understanding of 
strategy assures that the feedback from questions regarding strategy assessment is valid and that 
it refers to the same shared concept of strategic decisions. 
The next set of open-ended questions was aimed at understanding the type of information 
that decision makers consult for strategic decisions. Nine out of ten interviewees reported some 
kind of experience-based information. Among the terms recalled, the most frequent were “we 
consult experts with experience in the specific type of decision we are facing”, “we talk to 
experienced people”, “we make use of lessons learned from our own decisions made in the past”, 
“our department keeps track of past strategic decision processes”. Also, eight out of ten 
interviewees declared that their organization keeps a “record” or “memoire” of important 
decisions, which is kept in an archive and is often consulted. An illustrative example of 
managers’ reliance on experience for strategy formulation is the following: 
“We try to monitor the environment and analyze as much data as we can. 
But that’s only one part of the picture. Then, we bring in the people with 
experience in our firm, and they take a look at the numbers and data 
analyses. The bottom line is that these people have been ‘there before’ and 
are aware of the potential risks we face in these large-impact endeavors. 
They’ve learned the lesson from past strategic decisions. […] I myself take 
into account my own experience, and think back to similar situations and 
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recall what I did right, what I did wrong. You always look at the past in 
these situations trying to avoid previous mistakes.” 
 
This example illustrates the relevance of past actions on current strategy formulation. 
When participants started to talk about experience or prior strategic decisions, we used this 
moment to ask them about retrospective evaluations of past strategic decisions. The question was 
simply ‘how do you evaluate the quality of a strategic decision made in the past?’. The answers 
to this question given by the ten interviewees converged to the same idea: they look at the 
outcome of the strategic decision to judge its quality. For seven out of the ten managers the first 
response to the question pointed to “results obtained”, “outcome” or “success” of the strategic 
decision. A representative example of interviewees answering in this line is the following: 
“I look at the results obtained from that particular strategic decision. If the 
decision turned out to be a big success, then we think of that as a high 
quality decision. Later on, those strategies are recalled as good examples 
in future strategic processes. Strategic failures are certainly caused by bad-
quality planning, […] (as if) something went wrong in the decision 
process, or some information was neglected”. 
 
Two other managers regarded this question as an obvious issue and did not hesitate to 
claim that “we just need to see the outcome of the decision, that’s obvious”, or “we check the 
overall results obtained from that decision, in terms of financial or economic performance, and 
that’s it”. Only two managers in the whole sample offered as a first response factors unrelated to 
decision outcomes, namely situational factors like “the environmental uncertainty at the time the 
decision was made”. One of them clearly illustrates the psychological effects of hindsight bias in 
the following way: 
“To assess a strategic decision made in the past we first try to evaluate the 
context in which the decision was made, the information we had, and other 
variables present at that time. Still, even though we know the decision was 
made under specific conditions and that it was probably the adequate 
decision at that point, we end up looking at the outcomes. It’s hard not to 
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focus on the outcomes. Especially when the outcomes are not what you 
expected; then it is hard not to compare the actual outcomes with the 
potential outcome of an alternative course of action”. 
 
This simplified interpretation of strategic actions not only suggests superstitious learning 
effects, but also a tendency to code unsuccessful strategic decisions as necessarily caused by poor 
decision processes and success as caused by flawless decisions. In accordance with this tendency 
to judge strategic decisions by their outcomes and not by the decision process, what may have 
been a high-quality strategy according to the facts available at the time may be incorrectly 
criticized and a good decision-maker may be unfairly punished. Overall, the perspectives of the 
ten interviewees show that managers use retrospective evaluations of past strategic decisions in 
order to make new strategic decisions. However, all the evidence suggests that managers not only 
are incapable of ignoring outcomes of strategic decisions to evaluate the quality of the process 
which lead to such decisions, but rather they use outcome information as a central estimator of 
the quality of such decision. This is a clear example of hindsight bias. The fact that managers 
establish a direct relationship between the observed outcome of a strategic decision and the 
quality of the decision process reflects a misleading understanding of the causal links between 
driving strategic outcomes, and leads to superstitious learning. Managers observing successful 
outcomes superstitiously learn that the decision processes underlying such successes are 
necessarily high-quality decisions, whereas failures are necessarily caused by poor decision 
processes. Although this may be the case in some cases, it is certainly not always true, and when 
samples from experience are small, this biased causal link leads to superstitious learning. 
Moreover, this leads to an underestimation of the risks involved in decisions coded as ‘good’ 
decisions, derived from an increased confidence in past successes. We therefore suggest the 
following propositions: 
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Proposition 1A: Hindsight bias in evaluations of past strategic decisions leads to 
superstitious learning. 
Proposition 1B: Retrospective evaluations of past strategic decisions lead to confusing 
misfortune (or unpredictable forces) for managerial incompetence, and fortune for managerial 
competence. 
Proposition 1C: Hindsight bias in evaluations of past strategic decisions leads to 
exaggerating the predictability of future strategic situations. 
 
 
Judging by availability of observed outcomes 
People, as well as most organizations, use samples of observed outcomes to construct beliefs 
about the outcomes that may follow choices in future situations. Through this heuristic 
mechanism, organizational members attempt to deduct patterns from what they observe and 
underplay other potential alternative outcomes (March et al., 1991). As it is difficult to establish 
causal relations between rare strategic decisions and corresponding outcomes, organizations tend 
to pay greater attention on observed outcomes and neglect the importance of any alternative 
outcomes that did not take place. 
However, to learn effectively from past strategic decisions, not only must observed 
outcomes be taken into account, but also the alternative hypothetical outcomes that have not 
occurred must be considered if the success likelihood of future decisions is to be assessed 
accurately (March et al., 1991; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992). This is particularly relevant for 
strategic decisions, where the causal paths between competence and performance at a task are 
difficult to specify due to high causal complexity and the influence of environmental 
impredictability, which implies that actual outcomes may not necessarily represent the most 
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likely outcome from the decision made (Powell, Lovallo and Caringal, 2006). By only 
incorporating outcome-related knowledge to the mental representation of a novel decision 
situation, managers cannot envisage outcomes other than those observed in the past, and this may 
lead them to underestimate the risks of unprecedented events. This reinforcement process 
exaggerates the likelihood of what has actually happened and underestimates the likelihood of 
what might have happened (March, 2006). 
Behavioral decision research suggests that people often estimate the likelihood of events 
by retrieving examples from memory, and in doing so the evaluation of frequencies or 
probabilities of an event often depend upon the ease of recall of such an event (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Raghubir and Menon, 2005). This “availability heuristic” is an effective tool to 
assess the probabilities of occurrence of an event in stable environments with frequent feedback. 
However, when events are selectively stored in memory and are therefore systematically easier to 
remember, the availability heuristic leads to biased likelihood judgments, where easily 
remembered events are perceived as having a greater probability of occurrence. Therefore, since 
only observed outcomes become readily available in the organization’s memory while non-
occurrences are discarded, managers retrieving past decisions for likelihood judgments of 
possible outcomes may form estimates that are biased towards observed outcomes. This logic 
points at the availability heuristic as a potential explanation for hindsight bias in evaluations of 
past strategy. 
We asked our interviewees to recall and describe a strategic decision made in the past. 
Every single manager easily recalled a successful strategic process while none recalled a failure. 
Among the examples, managers mentioned “redesigning the clinic building to incorporate new 
functional areas, and to accommodate existing services in order to provide a more flexible yet 
efficient service overall”, “changing the existing payroll scheme to a performance-pay system, 
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which requires new contracts, changes in the schedules of most employees and incorporation of 
new staff”, or “the introduction of a new technologies in the sterilization service which implied 
the restructuring of the whole service, leading to layoffs and incorporation of qualified staff”, all 
of which resulted in successful improvements of organizational performance. These answers 
suggest that not only observed outcomes are given more importance than non-occurrences, but 
also successes are more salient in memory than failures. Related to this point, one of the 
interviewees reported that: 
“When looking backwards for lessons from past strategy I tend to focus on 
big successes. I tend to analyze past strategic decisions depending on the 
salience of their impact; if the impact of a decision was great and salient I 
consider it as a useful example to learn from it. May be in the future a 
similar situation may come up, and knowing that a specific strategy 
worked out well, makes me feel more prepared for facing similar situations 
in the future”.  
 
Because successful outcomes appear to be easier to recall and become more readily 
available than failures, the consequence of judgments by availability is that the perceived 
probability of success of strategic processes that were stored in memory as ‘successful’ is higher 
than for events remembered as ‘failure’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; MacLeod and Campbell, 
1992). This tendency has direct implications for strategic decision making. When successes in 
risky strategic decisions (e.g., the successful introduction of radical innovations) are over-
represented in the pool of experiential knowledge while failures are under-represented, managers 
may gain excessive confidence in their strategic decision making abilities. We therefore suggest 
the propositions. 
Proposition 2A: Retrospective evaluations of past strategic decisions are biased towards 
observed outcomes because memories from the past are retrieved following the availability 
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heuristic, through which actual occurrences are easily recalled while non-occurrences are 
neglected. 
Proposition 2B: Retrospective evaluations of past strategic decisions are overly optimistic 
because successful outcomes are more readily available than failures in the organization’s 
memory. 
Proposition 2C: Hindsight bias in the evaluation of past strategic decisions is partly 
caused by the availability heuristic.  
 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
Individuals are well equipped for learning from experience when they experience multiple trials 
and get accurate feedback (Hogarth, 2001). For example, managers learn that a certain production 
process is better than other because, after repeating both processes several times, they 
consistently observe that one process outperforms the other. Conversely, when tasks do not have 
this structure because the context is novel, ambiguous, and the feedback received from such tasks 
is limited and unclear, learning from the past becomes challenging. Yet, managers cope with this 
type of situations in the same way as they do with those more frequently encountered. The result 
of this poor learning process is superstitious learning. Even if managers acquire competence 
through experiencing rare strategic decision processes, they often learn the wrong lesson and 
induce misleading causal relations between decisions and outcomes.  
Throughout the paper we claimed that a key factor explaining superstitious learning is the 
robust and commonly observed hindsight bias. Once managers know that an outcome has 
occurred their perceived likelihood of that event increases. Therefore, managers tend to believe 
that this relative inevitability was apparent before the event. Another problem with hindsight bias 
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has to do with reward and punishment structures. As noted by Fischhoff (1975), “when second 
guessed by a hindsightful observer, his misfortune appears to have been incompetence, or 
worse.” Judging the competence of a management team based on the outcomes achieved in rare 
strategic decisions may lead to rewarding people who have been lucky or happened to achieve a 
successful outcome for unknown causes outside their control, and may punish competent 
managers in situations where misfortune or unpredictable events played a major role. One way to 
help solve this problem is by rewarding managers for the quality in the decision process (e.g. 
alternatives considered, exhaustiveness of information search, reliance on external advice, proper 
assessment of the risks involved, etc.) and not solely on outcomes.  
In the last part of the paper we elaborated on the tendency to over-rely on observed 
outcomes.  Individuals tend to learn from what they observe but not necessarily from what they 
do not observe. This form of logic is common among managers and is widely implemented by 
most business schools, where the case method is precisely intended to give students a base from 
which to draw useful examples for future similar situations they may face (Gavetti et al., 2005). 
This behavior can have the advantage of rapid adaptation in unchanging environments with 
frequent feedback, but the disadvantage is that valid learning often requires knowing things that 
have not been observed (Hogarth, 2001). Giving excessive importance to observed outcomes 
while disregarding the non-occurrences of possible alternative outcomes can prompt managers to 
underestimate the risks involved in strategic decisions. Top managers tend to use their sample of 
past experiences as unbiased estimators of the chances of success in similar future decisions. This 
poses a problem because the stored memories of past experiences overweight the presence of 
successes while they also underrepresent less desirable events. Through this process, strategies 
that turned out successfully, irrespective of their quality, are stored in the organizations memory 
and become readily available for future retrieval. In this way, this biased construction of common 
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beliefs is stored in the form of causal links between decisions and outcomes and become 
incorporated in the organization’s set of beliefs.  
Whereas in our every-day life, simplifications in the reconstruction of memory may be a 
useful mechanism to help cope with the excessive amount of information found in the 
environment, it can have a great impact in novel and complex contexts where the possibility of 
accurately predicting outcomes is low or nonexistent. Nonetheless, reshaping our understanding 
of the world in terms of what has already been seen to happen can also be a beneficial adaptive 
behavior. The disadvantages of biased memory reconstruction are probably outweighted by the 
benefits of adaptive learning (Pohl, 2004). Memory has a limited capacity, and it is important to 
store events in a coherent way that allows recall. Environmental conditions render the 
identification of useful relations arduous, and it is therefore economical to concentrate and 
remember the relations that work and forget those that did not (Hogarth, 1987).  
A key difference in the ability to learn correctly from experience is the extent to which 
individuals engage in counterfactual thinking (Baron, 1999). When people reflect on the past 
events that are available in their memory, they often think not only of the events that actually 
happened but also about how those events might have happened differently (Walsh and Byrne, 
2004). This is done by mentally undoing the aspects of the decision process that led to the 
observed outcome.  
One way of increasing the amount of alternative outcomes available in a manager’s pool 
of knowledge is to imagine how past decisions could have produced different (yet possible) 
outcomes. By increasing the number of alternatives retrieved from past decisions, counterfactual 
thinking provides a better understanding of the process that underlies the observed cause-effect 
relation (Morris and Moore, 2000). The ability of managers to extensively retrieve relevant 
information cues from the past and conceive different alternative scenarios can reduce the degree 
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to which judgments are biased toward easily available information. In this respect, research on 
entrepreneurial activities in organizations suggests that entrepreneurial managers are less likely 
than other managers to engage in counterfactual thinking and therefore more likely to perceive 
situations as more favorable (e.g. less risky) to them (Baron, 1999). This means that failure to 
engage in counterfactual thinking may lead to risk-taking as a consequence of overlooking 
potential negative events. In sum, counterfactual thinking can improve outcome and frequency 
judgments by increasing the set of available alternatives retrieved from past experiences. 
Managerial risk taking is crucial for a firm’s strategy and, consequently, for its 
performance (Simon and Houghton, 2003; Hambrick 2007). Becoming aware of the heuristic 
mechanisms that lead to biases in experiential learning can enhance organizational strategy 
formulation by reducing unnecessary risk-taking. The theories of competitive advantage 
implicitly assume that managers have a significant degree of foresight about the emergence of 
strategic advantages (Ahuja, Coff and Lee, 2005). While this article challenges this view, we 
sustain however that managers can present a competitive advantage when they understand the 
limits of managerial foresight and the nature of adaptive learning. 
We realize that this article has limitations. The propositions suggested, although 
potentially testable, require intrusive access to individual-level information from managers which 
is usually hard to obtain (Hambrick, 2007). Moreover, several individual-level (e.g. managers’ 
background, years of tenure, motivational differences) and environmental-level variables (e.g. 
environmental complexity) may moderate the effect of heuristic decision making on decision 
biases, so we are aware that a more comprehensive model would benefit from such controls. 
Opportunities for future research in this line also include an examination of organizational 
outcomes as a function of the presence — and degree — of the cognitive biases arising in the 
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experiential learning process. This type of research may be served by simulation techniques, 
since acquiring individual-level data is often a restriction. 
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